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TAXING REALITY: RETHINKING
PARTNERSHIP DISTRIBUTIONS
Andrea Monroe*
Partnerships play an increasingly vital role in the federal income
tax. Yet partnership taxation is deeply flawed, with complicated
provisions that strain the voluntary compliance mechanism on which all
federal income tax relies. This Article considers one of the most difficult
challenges facing partnership taxation: the treatment of distributions.
Distributions are ubiquitous transactions that transfer cash or
property from a partnership to a partner. Although distributions vary
dramatically in their purpose and the kind of property involved, their
tax treatment follows a unitary approach. The principle of
“nonrecognition” means that distributions do not produce any
immediate tax consequences. This nonrecognition premise has caused
great abuse and complexity, as partnerships have used distributions as
tax shelter vehicles, and the government has responded with narrow
anti-abuse “fixes” that are often counterproductive. Calls to reform
these anti-abuse provisions have been a constant presence throughout a
half-century of tax scholarship.
This Article argues that the existing scholarship largely
misconstrues the problem with partnership distributions. The core
difficulty is the nonrecognition premise at the system’s foundation, the
very problem that particular anti-abuse provisions were designed to
combat. Meaningful reform of partnership distributions thus requires a
fundamental rethinking of nonrecognition and its role in partnership
taxation.
This Article offers an alternative vision of partnership
distributions, one without the imprint of nonrecognition. It reimagines
partnership distributions from a recognition-based perspective, which
would ground the tax treatment of these transactions in economic
reality. Of particular importance are liquidating distributions that
involve the complete or partial termination of a partner’s investment in
the partnership. Consistent with their commercial substance,
* Associate Professor of Law, Temple University; J.D. University of Michigan Law
School; LL.M. in Taxation, New York University School of Law. Many thanks for comments on
earlier drafts to Alice Abreu, Jane Baron, Craig Green, Anthony Infanti, Greg Mandel, and Philip
Postlewaite. Thanks also to Andreas Andrews, Mike Belleville, Eleanor Bradley, Theresa Hearn,
Alexandra Lastowski, Devin McCauley, and Benjamin Weiss for marvelous research assistance.
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liquidating distributions should be treated as taxable exchanges in
which the partner receives cash or property from the partnership in
exchange for relinquishing her interest in the partnership and its
underlying property. Under a recognition-based approach, partnership
distributions would indeed look very different than they do today,
simpler, more equitable, and more stable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal income tax is undeniably complicated, too
complicated for most taxpayers. A recent study by the Office of the
Taxpayer Advocate found that “it takes U.S. taxpayers (both
individuals and businesses) more than 6.1 billion hours to complete
filings required by a tax code that contains almost four million words
and that, on average, has more than one new provision added to it
daily.”1 Despite these efforts, many taxpayers cannot get it right, as
they find themselves unable to understand or apply the tax law. Other
taxpayers find opportunity in this complexity, using it to blur the line
between proper planning and improper abuse.
These dynamics are even more troublesome in partnership
taxation, which plays an increasingly vital role in the federal income
tax system.2 In recent years, partnerships and other non-corporate
entities have earned more than half of the business income reported
to the federal government.3 During this same period, the number of
partnerships increased sharply, and more businesses today operate as
partnerships than as corporations.4
Yet the legal complexities of partnership taxation present unique
challenges. Subchapter K, which contains the provisions governing
the taxation of partnerships and their partners, is distinctively
grounded in a commitment to taxpayer flexibility. Its rules are
1. 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2012 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS (2012), available at
www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/Full-Report/Volume-1.pdf [hereinafter 2012 NTA
Report].
2. In this Article, the term “partnership” is used to refer to any entity, including a limited
liability company, electing to be treated as a partnership for federal income tax purposes. Treas.
Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 (as amended in 2009), -2 (as amended in 2009), -3 (as amended in 2006).
3. See THE PRESIDENT’S ECON. RECOVERY ADVISORY BD., THE REPORT ON TAX REFORM
OPTIONS: SIMPLIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND CORPORATE TAXATION 74–75 (2010), available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/PERAB_Tax_Reform_Report.pdf;
MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42359, WHO EARNS PASS-THROUGH BUSINESS
INCOME? AN ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL TAX RETURN DATA 1 n.1 (2012), available at
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42359.pdf; Pamela F. Olson, And Then Cnut Told Reagan . . ., 131
TAX NOTES 993, 995 (2011).
4. See 2012 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 21 (noting that in 2011, 3.6 million partnership
tax returns were filed, as compared to the 2.3 million C corporations that filed returns); INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., 2011 DATA BOOK 4–5 tbl.2, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/11databk.pdf. Additionally, the number of partnerships grew at an average annual rate of 4.7
percent from 2001 to 2010. See Nina Shumofsky et al., Partnership Returns, 2010, 32 STAT. OF
INCOME BULL., Fall 2012, at 79.
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generally designed to maximize a partnership’s ability to structure its
affairs in whatever manner the partners consider commercially
optimal.5 This flexibility, however, has come at a steep price in the
form of tax abuse and complexity. Partnerships have become the
preferred vehicle for tax shelter transactions due largely to
subchapter K’s permissive rules; and subchapter K, in turn, has
become crowded with a complicated patchwork of provisions
designed to combat these abusive transactions.6 A vicious cycle has
thus emerged in partnership taxation: flexibility leads to abuse, such
abuse triggers governmental responses that are typically complicated
and rarely complete, and these responses inspire the next generation
of tax shelter transactions. This cycle continues today at significant
public cost, compromising partner compliance, government
revenues, and subchapter K’s public legitimacy.
This Article will consider one of subchapter K’s most difficult
problems—the treatment of partnership distributions.7 Distributions
are ubiquitous transactions involving the transfer of cash or property
from a partnership to a partner. Distributions vary dramatically based
on their purpose, the type of assets involved, and their legal effect,
but their tax treatment largely follows a unitary approach. Consistent
5. See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 65 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4091; S.
REP. NO. 83-1622, at 89 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4721; see also Mark P.
Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Special Allocations, 46 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 (1999); Darryll K.
Jones, Towards Equity and Efficiency in Partnership Allocations, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1047, 1078
(2006); Jerome Kurtz, The Limited Liability Company and the Future of Business Taxation: A
Comment on Professor Berger's Plan, 47 TAX L. REV. 815, 821 (1992); Lawrence Lokken,
Taxation of Private Business Firms: Imagining a Future Without Subchapter K, 4 FLA. TAX REV.
249, 254 (1999); George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 FLA. TAX
REV. 141, 154 (1999).
6. This Article adopts the following definition of a tax shelter: an abusive transaction “is a
transaction which is designed to technically comply with the letter of the law, but which produces
tax savings that are inappropriate to the underlying purposes of the statutory scheme and
inconsistent with the economic reality of the transaction.” Noël B. Cunningham & James R.
Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 20 (2004); Alan Gunn, The Use and
Misuse of Antiabuse Rules: Lessons from the Partnership Antiabuse Regulations, 54 SMU L.
REV. 159, 164 (2001).
7. One might wonder why partnership distributions have received so little attention
throughout the years. Professor William Andrews proposed the following answer: “Likely
reasons in fact why distributions have not been a matter of legislative attention in their own right
are (1) the relative complexity of the problems presented by distributions (of which persistent
readers will soon have ample experience), and (2) the tendency to analyze, teach and study
partnership problems chronologically over the life of a hypothetical partnership, so that
contributions come relatively early while distributions are only reached relatively late when
analyst, teacher and student are all exhausted.” William D. Andrews, Inside Basis Adjustments
and Hot Asset Exchanges in Partnership Distributions, 47 TAX L. REV. 3, 7 n.20 (1991).
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with subchapter K’s commitment to flexibility, distributions are
generally treated as “nonrecognition” events.8 That is, distributions
do not trigger any immediate tax consequences for the partnership or
the distributee partner. This policy has led to great abuse, with
partnerships often using distributions as tax shelter vehicles. In the
past half-century, Congress and the Department of the Treasury
(“Treasury”) have responded to abusive distributions with
complicated “fixes,” each working to prevent particular abuses
without infringing on legitimate partnership transactions.
The section 751(b) disproportionate distribution rule is the most
important of these fixes, standing as the primary bulwark against
abusive distributions.9 It is also one of subchapter K’s most highly
criticized provisions. Section 751(b)’s complexity is matchless, as it
involves a seven-step computational process that includes three
fictional transactions between the distributee partner and the
partnership.10 Even so, the provision fails to prevent many of the
abuses that it was designed to eliminate. Calls for reforming or
repealing section 751(b) have thus continued from the provision’s
codification in 1954 to the present.11
This Article argues that section 751(b)’s critics have
misconstrued the problem. Section 751(b) is not the problem with

8. I.R.C. § 731(a)–(b) (2006).
9. Andrews, supra note 7, at 4.
10. WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS
¶ 21.03 (4th ed. 2007).
11. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT—TAXATION OF PRIVATE
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: MEMORANDUM NO. 3 65–77 (1997) [hereinafter AM. LAW INST.,
MEMORANDUM NO. 3]; AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT—SUBCHAPTER K:
PROPOSALS ON THE TAXATION OF PARTNERS 51–55 (1984) [hereinafter AM. LAW INST.,
SUBCHAPTER K PROJECT]; AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF TAXATION, TAX SECTION
RECOMMENDATION NO. 1974–11, reprinted in Committee on Partnerships, 27 TAX LAW. 839,
842, 876 (1974); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 86TH CONG.,
SUMMARY OF THE SUBCHAPTER K ADVISORY GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS ON PARTNERS AND
PARTNERSHIPS 40 (1959); Andrews, supra note 7, at 52–55; Curtis J. Berger, W(h)ither
Partnership Taxation?, 47 TAX L. REV. 105, 148 (1991); Karen C. Burke, Partnership
Distributions: Options for Reform, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 677, 713–17 (1998); James S. Eustice,
Subchapter S Corporations and Partnerships: A Search for the Pass Through Paradigm (Some
Preliminary Proposals), 39 TAX L. REV. 345, 381–85 (1984); Mark P. Gergen, Reforming
Subchapter K: Contributions and Distributions, 47 TAX L. REV. 173, 200 (1991); Christopher H.
Hanna, Partnership Distributions: Whatever Happened to Nonrecognition?, 82 KY. L. REV. 465,
469–85 (1994); Philip F. Postlewaite et al., A Critique of the ALI’s Federal Income Tax Project –
Subchapter K: Proposals on the Taxation of Partners, 75 GEO. L.J. 423, 596–611 (1986); E.
George Rudolph, Collapsible Partnerships and Optional Basis Adjustments, 28 TAX L. REV. 211,
217 (1957); Yin, supra note 5, at 233–38.
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partnership distributions, despite its many technical and structural
flaws. The problem with partnership distributions is the
nonrecognition premise at the system’s foundation, the very problem
that section 751(b) was designed to fix. Reforming section 751(b) is
therefore not the answer. Meaningful reform of partnership
distributions requires a foundational rethinking of the role of
nonrecognition in subchapter K. A first step in this process is to
rationalize the tax treatment of partnership distributions, aligning it
with the economic reality of these transactions. In doing so,
partnership distributions would become simpler and less prone to
abuse. Indeed, reconceptualizing distributions would promote
stability in subchapter K, grounding our thinking about this crucial
transaction in coherent principles.
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part II begins with an
introduction to distributions, their persistent challenges, and their
unique position in subchapter K. It maps the dysfunctionality of
modern distributions, tracing the system’s flaws to the foundational
premise at its core—nonrecognition. Part III proposes an alternative
vision of partnership distributions designed to promote simplicity,
equity, and stability in subchapter K. This approach first divides
distributions into two categories: operating distributions and
liquidating distributions. It then turns to the tax treatment of each
category, proposing rules that correspond to the commercial
substance of the underlying distribution transaction. This Article’s
primary reforms relate to liquidating distributions, which typically
involve the partial or complete termination of a partner’s investment
in a partnership. Under this proposal, these distributions would be
taxable, viewed as transactions where a partner relinquishes her
partnership interest and, in exchange, receives cash or property from
the partnership.
II. THE PROBLEM OF PARTNERSHIP DISTRIBUTIONS
The story of partnership distributions is much like the larger
story of subchapter K. It begins with a system designed to maximize
partnership freedom and ends with a system that is complex,
inequitable, and utterly dysfunctional. This part traces the evolution
of partnership distributions from the vantage of the system’s
foundational nonrecognition premise, analyzing the role of
nonrecognition in the discord surrounding these transactions.
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A. Nonrecognition-Based Partnership Distributions
When Congress codified subchapter K in 1954, it hoped to
create a system of taxation that was flexible, simple, and fair.12
Subchapter K’s original provisions prioritized flexibility, allowing
partnerships to structure their affairs in whatever manner they
considered commercially optimal.13 Simplicity was also important,
as Congress wanted subchapter K to be accessible to all partnerships
regardless of their sophistication level.14 Equity, in contrast, was
largely viewed as an intrapartnership matter. Congress wanted
partners’ relative tax burdens to be fair in light of their relative
circumstances, but it largely considered the revenue stakes in
subchapter K insufficiently high to warrant government
intervention.15 In the few instances where abusive transactions posed
a revenue threat to the federal government, however, Congress
adopted affirmative anti-abuse provisions, thus fortifying subchapter
K’s ability to treat partners fairly based on their relative economic
position.
The original provisions governing partnership distributions
follow this model. Subchapter K’s commitment to flexibility is
reflected in the system’s foundational nonrecognition premise.16
Likewise, these provisions took a largely laissez-faire approach to
equity, only focusing on abuse prevention in one particular situation.
Simplicity, in contrast, was a different matter. As this part will
demonstrate, partnership distributions, and subchapter K more
generally, have never been simple.
1. The Basics of Subchapter K
As a starting point, a brief introduction to partnership taxation
may prove useful. Subchapter K is a pass-through system of taxation.
12. See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 65 (1954); S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 89 (1954).
13. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 65; S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 89.
14. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 65; S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 89.
15. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 65; S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 89. In the federal income tax
context, equity is best explored through two components: horizontal equity and vertical equity.
Horizontal equity requires that similarly situated taxpayers be taxed in the same manner. See, e.g.,
JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 30 (1985);
Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 1325 (2008); Xuan-Thao Nguyen &
Jeffrey A. Maine, Equity and Efficiency in Intellectual Property Taxation, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1,
3 (2010). Vertical equity, in contrast, requires that partners with greater income be taxed more
than those with less income. See, e.g., WITTE, supra at 30.
16. I.R.C. § 731(a)–(b) (2006).
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Unlike a corporation where income is taxed to the entity and again to
its shareholders, a partnership’s income is only subject to one level
of tax. A partnership is not considered a taxpayer; instead, its
partners pay tax on their shares of the partnership’s annual income.17
Subchapter K thus performs an allocative function, dividing the
partnership’s income among its partners.18
This unique pass-through role raises a foundational question of
how to think of the partnership itself for federal income tax purposes.
In many respects, a partnership can be thought of as an aggregate of
its owners. Under this aggregate theory, a partnership is effectively
disregarded, with its partners treated as direct co-owners of each item
of the partnership’s property. Yet in other respects, a partnership can
be thought of as an entity separate and distinct from its owners.
Under this entity theory, partners are treated like shareholders in a
corporation, owning interests in the partnership entity itself, rather
than interests in the partnership’s underlying property.
Instead of adopting a uniform theory of partnerships, subchapter
K follows both approaches, with different provisions reflecting
different theories. On one hand, numerous computational and
administrative provisions reflect the entity theory. For instance, a
partnership computes its own taxable income and determines the
character of any recognized gains or losses.19 On the other hand,
subchapter K’s pass-through model embodies the aggregate theory,
taxing partners directly on their share of a partnership’s income.20
Because the aggregate theory animates subchapter K’s distinctive
pass-through feature, the theory’s view of partners as direct coowners of partnership property serves as a useful touchstone when
working through foundational issues in partnership taxation, such as
the treatment of distributions.
This pass-through function also highlights the deep tensions in
subchapter K. To illustrate, imagine that A, B, and C form a
partnership to sell goods to the public, and each partner holds an
equal one-third interest in the partnership. C signs a major account

17. Id. § 701. Indeed, the partners are taxable annually on their share of the partnership’s
income without regard to whether the corresponding funds are distributed to them during the
relevant year.
18. Id. § 704(b).
19. Id. §§ 702(b), 703(a).
20. Id. § 701.
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and, hence, she is responsible for virtually all of the partnership’s
income during the current year. In light of this development, the
partners might decide to amend their partnership agreement,
requiring the partnership to allocate taxable income among the
partners based on their relative sales. But the partners might also
decide against this approach, instead retaining their equal allocation
arrangement. Notwithstanding C’s disproportionate share of the
partnership’s sales, subchapter K would permit the partnership to
allocate its taxable income in this manner, one-third to each
partner.21
In doing so, subchapter K challenges one of the most
foundational premises of the federal income tax—that a transaction’s
tax consequences should match its economic consequences. Income
is generally taxed to the person who performs the services or owns
the property that produces that income.22 Yet a partnership seems to
change this equation, allowing the partners to shift tax liability
among themselves. Indeed, subchapter K allows partners to achieve
tax results that they could not achieve in their individual capacities,
and this freedom is largely responsible for both the popularity and
the problems of partnership taxation.
If left unchecked, this type of flexibility creates opportunities for
partners to reduce their aggregate tax liability, sometimes at great
public cost. Returning to the ABC partnership, consider the
consequences if C were allocated one-third of the partnership’s
taxable income but allocated an amount of its economic gain
corresponding to her share of the partnership’s sales.23 C would
21. See Schneer v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 643, 658 (1991) (“If partners were not able to share
profits in an amount disproportionate to the ratio in which they earned the underlying income, the
partnership provisions of the Code would, to some extent, be rendered unnecessary.”).
22. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118 (1940) (“The power to dispose of income is
the equivalent of ownership of it. The exercise of that power to procure the payment of income to
another is the enjoyment, and hence the realization, of the income by him who exercises it.”);
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114–15 (1930) (“There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries
to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory
arrangements and contracts however ‘skillfully’ devised to prevent the salary when paid from
vesting even for a second in the man who earned it. That seems to us the import of the statute
before us . . . .”).
23. Operationally, these allocations are implemented through accounts that track a partner’s
economic and tax investments in the partnership. A partner’s economic investment in a
partnership is measured by her “capital account.” Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv). In general
terms, the partner’s capital account balance equals the amount that the partner is entitled to
receive on liquidation of her partnership interest. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2). A partner’s tax
investment, in contrast, is measured by her basis in her partnership interest, referred to as “outside
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receive the economic benefit of almost all of the partnership’s
income, thereby entitling her to receive these funds on the liquidation
of her partnership interest.24 But C would not bear the corresponding
tax liability for much of this income; her partners, A and B, would.
Put another way, A and B would bear the tax liability corresponding
to funds earmarked for C.
One might wonder why A and B would agree to this
arrangement. The answer often lies in the partners’ individual tax
rates: if C’s marginal tax rate were higher than her partners, then
shifting the partnership’s taxable income from her to A and B would
benefit the partnership, reducing the average tax rate applied to its
income.25 The partnership would thus win, with the income shift
producing a net tax savings for its partners. The federal government,
in contrast, would lose, deprived of the tax revenues necessary to
finance its operations.
Because of these revenue concerns, Congress’s commitment to
flexibility in partnership taxation could not be limitless. At some
point, Congress had to intervene, drawing a line between permissible
partnership transactions and impermissible tax sheltering. These
congressional efforts have taken many forms throughout the years,
but all have been grounded in the premise that the tax and economic
consequences of a transaction should match.26 A partner’s economic
basis,” which represents the amount of the partner’s investment in the partnership that has
previously been subject to tax. I.R.C. § 705.
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2).
25. To illustrate, let’s assume that the ABC partnership has $3,000 of taxable income in the
current year. C is responsible for generating 80 percent of the underlying sales, and A and B are
each responsible for generating 10 percent of the partnership’s sales. Let’s further assume that A’s
and B’s individual income tax rate is 0 percent, and C’s individual income tax rate is 39.6 percent.
If the partnership allocated its taxable income in proportion to each partner’s sales, C would be
allocated $2,400 of taxable income ($3,000 total taxable income * 0.8 allocation ratio), and her
resulting tax liability would be $950 ($2,400 allocated taxable income * 0.396 tax rate). A and B
would each be allocated $300 of taxable income ($3,000 total taxable income * 0.1 allocation
ratio), but neither partner would incur a tax liability. Taken together, the partners would pay taxes
of $950 on taxable income of $3,000.
If, in contrast, the partnership allocated its taxable income equally among the partners,
the partners’ aggregate tax liability would decrease because less taxable income would be subject
to tax at C’s 39.6 percent individual income tax rate. The partnership would now allocate $1,000
of taxable income to C, and her resulting tax liability would be $396 ($1,000 allocated taxable
income * 0.396 tax rate). Likewise, the partnership would allocate $1,000 of taxable income to
both A and B, and neither partner would incur a tax liability. Accordingly, the aggregate tax
liability of the partners would now be $396, resulting in a net tax savings of $554.
26. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 704(b). The provisions governing partnership allocations provide a
useful example of this premise. As originally enacted, these provisions allowed partnerships great
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investment in a partnership thus functions as a benchmark in
subchapter K: if a partner receives an economic benefit from a
partnership, she should also bear the corresponding tax burden.27
Returning to the ABC partnership, one can see how subchapter
K implements this premise. If the partners wish to share the
partnership’s tax burden equally, then they must also share its
economic benefits equally.28 The partnership may thus allocate
one-third of its taxable income to C, even though she is responsible
for a larger percentage of the partnership’s sales. This allocation,
however, would only be permissible if the partnership were to
allocate C one-third of the corresponding economic income. In doing
so, C would reduce her tax liability, but at a steep price—a
diminished share of the related economic benefit. Considered in this
light, C’s acquiescence in this arrangement would likely stem from
legitimate commercial considerations; perhaps each partner’s share
of annual sales is unpredictable, fluctuating dramatically from one
year to the next. Linking the tax and economic consequences of a
transaction in this manner thus serves a signaling function,
highlighting that commercial considerations, rather than tax
sheltering, animated the partners’ arrangement.29
This tension between flexibility and equity runs throughout
subchapter K, shaping the rules governing every event in a
partnership’s life. Flexibility is subchapter K’s priority, and
partnerships have great latitude in structuring transactions. Yet
equity is also important, guiding much of our foundational thinking
freedom in allocating their taxable items so long as the resulting allocations did not have a
principal purpose of tax avoidance or evasion. Id. § 704(b) (1954). This standards-based approach
to partnership allocations proved problematic, and Congress ultimately amended subchapter K,
adopting the substantial economic effect safe harbor. Id. § 704(b) (1976). Under this approach,
the partnership’s contractual allocations will be respected to the extent they have substantial
economic effect. Id.
27. I.R.C. § 704(b) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2).
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a). This “economic effect” requirement provides that a
partner’s capital account, which reflects her economic investment in the partnership, and a
partner’s outside basis, which reflects her tax investment in the partnership, should move in
unison: if a partnership allocates one dollar of economic income to a partner, as reflected in an
increase to her capital account, then it should similarly allocate one dollar of taxable income to
her, as reflected in an increase to her basis in her partnership interest. Id.
29. See, e.g., GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX
PROJECT: TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: REPORTERS’ STUDY (1999); Emily
Cauble, Was Blackstone’s Initial Public Offering Too Good to be True?: A Case Study in Closing
Loopholes in the Partnership Tax Allocation Rules, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 153, 171 (2013); Lokken,
supra note 5, at 254; Yin, supra note 5, at 157.
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about how partnerships should operate. Nonetheless, Congress’s
commitment to equity was not always reflected in subchapter K’s
provisions. Indeed, Congress considered equity an intrapartnership
matter to be resolved by the partners themselves, only intervening in
those rare instances where partnership inequities jeopardized federal
revenues.
Considered in this light, equity’s secondary role in subchapter
K’s original provisions is best viewed as a congressional
miscalculation. Congress underestimated the revenue cost of abusive
partnership transactions, like the income shifting discussed in the
preceding example.30 As a result, it left partnerships largely alone,
unencumbered by equity-based restrictions on their freedom. It is
through this lens that we now turn to subchapter K’s greatest
transactional challenge—partnership distributions.
2. The Basics of Partnership Distributions
Distributions are ubiquitous in the partnership world, involving
the transfer of cash or property from a partnership to a partner.31
Distributions, however, are not homogenous transactions;
partnerships make distributions for numerous reasons, and their
impact on a partnership and its partners varies accordingly.
To illustrate, consider again the ABC partnership. During the
partnership’s life, one could envision various events that would give
rise to a distribution. For instance, the partnership might distribute a
portion of its annual profits to the partners through a ratable cash
distribution. In this scenario, the distribution represents income
previously allocated and taxed to each partner.32 Accordingly, this
distribution itself would not change anything among the partners;
before and after the distribution, each partner would have a one-third
interest in the partnership. I will refer to this type of distribution as
an “operating distribution.”

30. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 5, at 1; Mark P. Gergen, The End of the Revolution in
Partnership Tax?, 56 SMU L. REV. 343, 348 (2003); Lokken, supra note 5, at 250; Andrea R.
Monroe, Integrity in Taxation: Rethinking Partnership Taxation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 289, 307
(2012).
31. In certain instances, liabilities also trigger subchapter K’s distribution provisions. If a
partner’s share of the partnership’s liabilities decreases, such decrease is treated as a deemed cash
distribution. I.R.C. § 752(b) (2006).
32. See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.
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In contrast, C might wish to retire from the partnership,
collecting her share of the partnership’s value and terminating her
investment in the enterprise. In this instance, the partnership would
make a distribution to C, and she would relinquish her partnership
interest. This is an example of a “complete liquidating distribution.”
It effects a commercially significant change in the partnership, with
C liquidating her entire investment. In doing so, the two remaining
partners are left as equal stakeholders in a reconstituted AB
partnership. Indeed, it is almost as if the distribution created a new
partnership.
Between these extremes, various other kinds of distributions
might occur, each marking an economic change in the partnership.
For example, C may require a large sum of money to finance her
son’s law school education. To this end, C might propose that she
relinquish a portion of her partnership interest in exchange for a
distribution. After the transaction, C would thus remain a partner, but
her partnership interest would be reduced. Like a complete
liquidating distribution, this “partially liquidating distribution”
affects the economics of the partnership. Indeed, the distribution
reconstitutes the ABC partnership, with C holding a reduced
partnership interest and A and B each holding a proportionately
increased partnership interest.
Despite their diversity, subchapter K largely treats these
distributions the same.33 Its basic provisions prioritize flexibility,
implementing this congressional commitment through a
nonrecognition rule. When a taxpayer disposes of property, the
transaction ordinarily triggers the taxation of any appreciation

33. In certain instances, subchapter K divides distributions into two categories: liquidating
distributions and current distributions. To that end, a “liquidation of a partner’s interest” in a
partnership is defined as the termination of a partner’s entire interest in a partnership through one
or a series of distributions. I.R.C. § 761(d). All other distributions, including partially liquidating
distributions, are treated as current distributions. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.731-1(a)(1)(i), 1.761–1(d). In
most instances, the separate provisions governing liquidating distributions are dictated by
necessity, reflecting the fact that the retiring partner does not possess an interest in the partnership
following the distribution. See I.R.C. §§ 731(a)(2) (losses recognized in certain complete
liquidating distributions), 732(b) (basis of property distributed in a complete liquidating
distribution). Section 736, which treats certain payments to a retiring partner as a distributive
share of partnership income or a guaranteed payment, is the exception. Id. § 736. It is a more
substantive partnership provision, but it only applies in limited circumstances. Id.; Philip F.
Postlewaite & Adam H. Rosenzweig, Anachronisms in Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue
Code: Is It Time to Part with Section 736?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 379 (2006).
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reflected in the property.34 The amount of this taxable gain is equal
to the difference between the property’s fair market value and its
basis, which represents the taxpayer’s tax investment in the property
at the time of disposition.35 In certain instances, however, Congress
made the affirmative decision that current taxation would be
inappropriate and instead deferred recognition of this appreciation
until the future.36 I will refer to this unrecognized tax appreciation as
“built-in gain.”
Partnership distributions are one such instance. Neither the
partnership nor the distributee partner recognizes gain on a
distribution.37 Rather, these transactions are designed to be invisible,
with no immediate tax consequences. Any built-in gain in the
distributee partner’s partnership interest is thus deferred for future
recognition when a more appropriate taxable event occurs.
To illustrate, consider again the ABC partnership. Imagine that
each partner contributed $100 of cash to the partnership at formation,
and it used $10 of these funds to purchase investment property
(“Redacre”). The partnership is successful, generating income of
$210 in its first year of operations. The partners share this income
equally, $70 each, and properly report such amounts on their
respective federal income tax returns.38 Because the partnership is
growing, it decides against making any corresponding cash
distributions to the partners during this period. Accordingly, the
partnership has the following balance sheet:

34. I.R.C. § 1001. For ease of reading, this Article discusses appreciated property and the
recognition of gains only. Even so, the following discussion applies equally to depreciated
property and the recognition of losses. Unless specifically provided otherwise, the reader may
thus assume that all references to gains, built-in gains, and appreciation also encompass their loss
equivalents.
35. Id. § 1001(a).
36. For a more detailed discussion of when nonrecognition is considered appropriate, see
infra notes 112–14 and accompanying text.
37. I.R.C. § 731(a) (nonrecognition for distributee partner), (b) (nonrecognition for
partnership). In contrast, distributions are treated as recognition events from an economic, or
book, perspective. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(e)(1). As will be discussed, the capital account
treatment of distributions is thus different from the corresponding tax treatment. For a more
detailed discussion of the capital account treatment of partnership distributions, see infra notes 41
and 45.
38. I.R.C. § 704(b). As a result of this income allocation, each partner would increase her
outside basis by $70, from $100 to $170. Id. § 705(a)(1)(A). Similarly, each partner would
increase her capital account by $70 to reflect the corresponding allocation of economic income.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b)(3).
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Assets

Basis

Value

Capital

Basis

Value

Cash
Redacre

500
10

500
100

A
B
C

170
170
170

200
200
200

Total

510

600

510

600

If the partnership distributes $10 of cash to each partner several years
later, subchapter K would treat the transaction as a nonrecognition
event, and no partner would recognize gain on the distribution.39 Any
built-in gain in their respective partnership interests would instead be
deferred for future taxation.
The mechanism subchapter K uses to achieve this deferral is
basis. A partner’s basis in her partnership interest, which I will refer
to as “outside basis,” must be adjusted following a distribution to
preserve the proper amount of built-in gain in her partnership
interest.40 Put another way, retaining a continuous relationship
between value and basis is necessary to ensure that any
pre-distribution built-in gain is taxed when the underlying property is
subsequently sold. Accordingly, a partner must reduce her outside
basis by the amount of cash received in a distribution in order to
preserve any built-in gain in her partnership interest.41
Returning to the ABC partnership’s $10 cash distribution, each
partner would reduce her outside basis by $10, from $170 to $160, as

39. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1). As will be discussed infra Part II.C, Congress has created numerous
exceptions to this general rule, each requiring a partner to recognize gain on a distribution. One
such exception warrants mention at this point: if a partner receives a cash distribution in excess of
her outside basis, she is required to recognize a gain equal to such excess cash distribution. Id.
The recognition of gain in this instance is essential because a basis adjustment cannot preserve the
built-in gain in the distributee partner’s partnership interest.
40. Id. § 733.
41. Id. A partnership distribution is treated as a recognition event for book purposes. When a
partner receives a distribution, she thus reduces her capital account by the amount of cash or the
fair market value of the property received in the distribution. Treas. Reg. § 1.7041(b)(2)(iv)(e)(1).

TAXING REALITY

10/7/2014 6:48 PM

2014]

673

TAXING REALITY

part of the transaction.42 In doing so, the basis reduction would
preserve the pre-distribution built-in gain in each partner’s respective
partnership interest. Before the distribution, each partner had a $30
built-in gain in her partnership interest, which had a fair market value
of $200 and a basis of $170. After the distribution, each partner has
$10 of cash and a partnership interest worth $190.43 In order to
preserve the $30 of pre-distribution built-in gain, each partner’s
outside basis must be reduced by $10. The partnership would thus
have the following post-distribution balance sheet:
Assets

Basis

Value

Capital

Basis

Value

Cash
Redacre

470
10

470
100

A
B
C

160
160
160

190
190
190

Total

480

570

480

570

This distribution would not alter the partner’s respective interests in
the partnership; each partner would remain an equal one-third partner
in the partnership. It is simply a means of transferring a ratable
portion of the partnership’s previously taxed income to each
partner.44 Considered in this light, treating this type of operating
distribution as a nonrecognition transaction is entirely consistent with
subchapter K’s pass-through function, ensuring a single level of tax
on the partnership’s income.
Subchapter K’s distribution provisions become more
challenging when the distribution involves appreciated property. The

42. I.R.C. § 733. In this instance, C would also reduce her capital account by $10, the
amount of cash received in the distribution. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(e)(1).
43. The $10 cash distribution reduced the fair market value of each partner’s partnership
interest by $10, from $200 to $190.
44. Since its formation, the partnership has earned $210 of taxable income, and each partner
has paid tax on her $70 allocated share of such income. The $10 cash distribution is best viewed
as the transfer of a portion of these previously taxed funds to the partners that incurred the
corresponding tax liability.
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provisions remain grounded in nonrecognition; hence, any built-in
gains will be deferred until a future disposition occurs. But
subchapter K’s nonrecognition premise must now operate at two
levels—the partnership level and the partner level—in each case
deferring the proper amount of pre-distribution built-in gain through
basis adjustments.
At the partnership level, a distribution of property will not
trigger immediate taxation of any built-in gain in the distributed
property to the partnership.45 This built-in gain will instead be
deferred, recognized by the distributee partner on a future disposition
of the distributed property. To implement this nonrecognition rule,
the distributee partner takes a basis in the distributed property equal
to the partnership’s basis in the property immediately before the
transaction.46 In doing so, subchapter K ensures the requisite
continuity in the relationship between the distributed property’s fair
market value and basis, thus preserving the aggregate amount of
pre-distribution built-in gain.
To illustrate, let’s return to the ABC partnership. This time, let’s
assume that C requires funds to finance her son’s law school
education, and she wishes to reduce her interest in the partnership
through a partially liquidating distribution. The partnership therefore
distributes Redacre to her and, in exchange, reduces her partnership
interest from one-third to one-fifth.47 Immediately before the

45. I.R.C. § 731(b). As previously noted, the capital account treatment of distributions is
different, grounded in a recognition rule. When a partnership distributes property to a partner, any
economic appreciation reflected in the property is recognized by the partnership and allocated
among all the partners based on their pre-distribution sharing arrangement, thereby increasing
each partner’s capital account. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(e)(1). Once the partnership makes
this adjustment, it then reduces the distributee partner’s capital account by the fair market value
of the distributed property. Id.
46. I.R.C. § 732(a)(1). There is, however, a limitation on this “transferred” basis rule. The
basis a distributee partner takes in the distributed property may not exceed the difference between
her pre-distribution outside basis and the amount, if any, of cash received in the distribution. Id.
§ 732(a)(2). If this limitation applies, the distributee partner’s basis in the distributed property
will not equal the partnership’s pre-distribution basis in such property; hence, the basis
adjustment will not succeed in preserving all of the built-in gain in the distributed property. For a
discussion of the challenges created by this “loss” of partnership basis, see infra note 121.
47. Before the distribution, the partnership is worth $600; it holds $500 in cash and Redacre
with a fair market value of $100. C’s partnership interest, in turn, has a fair market value of $200.
Accordingly, C’s interest in the partnership would be a one-third interest ($200 fair market value
of partnership interest / $600 fair market value of partnership). After the distribution, the
partnership is worth only $500, having distributed Redacre to C. Likewise, the receipt of Redacre
reduced the fair market value of C’s partnership interest by $100, from $200 to $100. C’s interest
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distribution, the partnership has the following balance sheet:
Assets

Basis

Value

Capital

Basis

Value

Cash
Redacre

500
10

500
100

A
B
C

170
170
170

200
200
200

Total

510

600

510

600

At this time, there is a $90 built-in gain in Redacre, which is
reflected in the difference between the property’s $100 fair market
value and its $10 basis. Because subchapter K treats distributions as
nonrecognition events, the partnership would not recognize this $90
gain when it transfers Redacre to C.48 The $90 built-in gain would be
deferred, with C now recognizing this gain on a future sale of
Redacre. To that end, C would take a $10 basis in Redacre, which
equals the partnership’s pre-distribution basis in the property.49 The
basis adjustment would thus preserve Redacre’s pre-distribution
built-in gain. The only difference would be the incidence of tax, now
falling on C rather than the partnership. If Redacre were sold for
$100 after the distribution, C, not the partnership, would recognize a
$90 gain.
Nonrecognition similarly drives the tax consequences at the
partner level. As previously discussed, the distributee partner does
not recognize any of the built-in gain in her partnership interest at the
time of distribution.50 This gain is instead deferred for future taxation
through a combination of basis adjustments made to her partnership
interest and the distributed property. Specifically, the partner takes a
basis in the distributed property equal to the partnership’s predistribution basis in the property and reduces her outside basis by a
in the partnership is thus one-fifth ($100 fair market value of partnership interest / $500 fair
market value of partnership).
48. I.R.C. § 731(b).
49. Id. § 732(a)(1).
50. See supra note 39.
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corresponding amount.51 These basis adjustments are designed to
ensure that the post-distribution built-in gain reflected in the
distributed property and the distributee partner’s partnership interest,
taken together, equal the pre-distribution built-in gain reflected in her
partnership interest.52
In the case of a complete liquidating distribution, subchapter K’s
distribution provisions, particularly those governing basis
adjustments, operate differently. They remain grounded in
nonrecognition, but they must now reflect the fact that the distributee
partner no longer has an interest in the partnership. As a result, all of
the pre-distribution built-in gain reflected in the distributee partner’s
partnership interest must now be reflected in the distributed property.
The distributee partner thus takes a basis in the distributed property
equal to her outside basis.53 Otherwise, a complete liquidating
distribution is treated like any other distribution.54
To illustrate the consequences to the distributee partner, let’s
return to the ABC partnership’s partially liquidating distribution to C.
Immediately before this distribution, C held a partnership interest
with a fair market value of $200 and an outside basis of $170; hence,
there was a $30 built-in gain in her interest. The distribution would
not trigger recognition of this gain.55 Taxation would instead be

51. I.R.C. §§ 732(a)(1), 733.
52. As discussed supra note 46, these basis adjustments do not always work perfectly;
hence, challenges often arise.
53. I.R.C. § 732(b). The distributee partner thus often takes a basis in the distributed
property that is different from the partnership’s pre-distribution basis in such property. As a
result, subchapter K’s transferred basis provisions may again fail to preserve the pre-distribution
built-in gain in the distributed property. For a discussion of the problems created by this basis
imbalance, see infra note 121.
54. See supra note 33. From a capital account perspective, there is a sharp difference in the
treatment of liquidating and non-liquidating distributions. If a partnership makes a distribution in
complete or partial liquidation of a partnership interest, the partnership may elect to “rebook” its
property. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(5)(ii). That is, the partnership may revalue all of its
property, thereby recognizing any economic appreciation in the property. These “book” gains
would then be allocated among the partners based on their pre-distribution sharing arrangement.
Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(1), (2). A rebooking thus allows all of the partners to share in the
economic gains of the partnership based on their pre-distribution sharing arrangement in
anticipation of a change in such arrangement, effectively “locking in” each partner’s share of the
partnership’s pre-distribution economic gains. Put another way, it reflects the fact that a
liquidating distribution—whether complete or partial—has a transformative effect on the
partnership. For a more detailed discussion of partnership rebookings, see generally MCKEE ET
AL., supra note 10, ¶ 11.02[2][c][ii]; ARTHUR B. WILLIS & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE,
PARTNERSHIP TAXATION ¶ 10.04[3][c] (7th ed. 2011) (2012).
55. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1).
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deferred, with the $30 of appreciation preserved through C’s postdistribution basis in Redacre and her partnership interest. As
previously discussed, C would take a $10 basis in Redacre.56 She
would thus decrease her outside basis by a corresponding amount,
reducing it from $170 to $160.57 After the distribution, the
partnership would have the following balance sheet:
Assets

Basis

Value

Capital

Basis

Value

Cash

500

500

A
B
C

170
170
160

200
200
100

Total

500

500

500

500

Taken together, C’s bases in Redacre and her post-distribution
partnership interest would preserve the $30 built-in gain in her
pre-distribution partnership interest. There would be a $90 built-in
gain reflected in Redacre, and C would recognize this gain if she
were to sell the property. Her partnership interest, in contrast, would
be worth $100 with an outside basis of $160. If C were to sell her
partnership interest, she would recognize a $60 loss. When these
results are combined, C would have a net built-in gain of $30 in her
post-distribution property, consistent with the pre-distribution builtin gain in her partnership interest.
More generally, subchapter K’s nonrecognition-based
distribution system is designed to preserve the aggregate amount of
pre-distribution built-in gain through the distributee partner’s postdistribution bases in the distributed property and her partnership
interest. This system, however, does not focus on the identity of the
taxpayer or the rate of tax that will be applied to such built-in gains
on a subsequent sale. Yet changes in the taxpayer or the tax rate raise
equitable concerns. Indeed, as will be discussed below, it is equally
56. See supra note 49.
57. I.R.C. § 733.
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important that distributions preserve the amount and character of
each partner’s share of the partnership’s pre-distribution built-in
gains.58
These equitable concerns are best explored by returning to the
aggregate theory of partnerships, where each partner is treated as
owning her respective share of each item of partnership property.59
As a direct owner of the partnership’s property, each partner would
be entitled to the benefits and burdens associated with such property,
including any built-in gain in the property. Because subchapter K
treats a distribution as a nonrecognition event, the transaction should
have no effect on the partners’ interest in any item of partnership
property. In fact, equity would seem to require that these predistribution built-in gains be preserved on a property-by-property
basis.
To illustrate, let’s return to the ABC partnership and its partial
liquidating distribution to C. Recall that there was a $90 built-in gain
in Redacre immediately before the distribution, and each partner’s
share of this gain was $30.60 Under the aggregate theory of
partnerships, each partner would thus be treated as if she directly
owned a one-third interest in Redacre, with a fair market value of
$33.33 and a basis of $3.33.61 Accordingly, there would be a $30
built-in gain in each partner’s interest in Redacre.
The partnership’s distribution of Redacre would alter these
shares. C would now own Redacre in her individual capacity; thus
she alone would bear the tax burden associated with Redacre. If C
were to sell Redacre for its fair market value of $100, she would
recognize a $90 gain. Put another way, the distribution would
increase her share of Redacre’s built-in gain by $60, from $30 to
$90. Likewise, the distribution would reduce A’s and B’s share of

58. See infra Part II.B.
59. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
60. Before the distribution, Redacre had a fair market value of $100 and a basis of $10. If the
partnership had sold Redacre rather than distributing it to C, it would have recognized a $90
capital gain. I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1221(a). This gain, in turn, would have been allocated equally
among the partners: $30 each. Id. § 704(b).
61. The fair market value of Redacre was $100. If the property were divided into three equal
interests, each interest would be worth $33.33 ($100 fair market value * 1/3). Likewise, the basis
in each interest would equal one-third of the partnership’s basis in Redacre, or $3.33 ($10 basis *
1/3).
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this built-in gain by a corresponding amount.62 The distribution
would allow A and B to dispose of their direct interests in Redacre in
a tax-free manner, but it would fail to preserve their respective builtin gains. Rather, the distribution would shift these built-in gains to
C.63
To summarize, subchapter K’s original distribution system
focused on preserving the aggregate amount of built-in gains
reflected in the distributed property and the distributee partner’s
partnership interest. But this system was not sensitive to the identity
of the taxpayer that would ultimately bear the corresponding federal
tax liability. Although taxpayer identity raised equitable concerns,
Congress did not believe that the related revenue stakes were
particularly high.64 Subchapter K’s distribution system thus did not
require that a distribution preserve the amount and character of each
partner’s share of the partnership’s pre-distribution built-in gains.
Subchapter K instead left the enforcement of these equitable
concerns largely up to partnerships themselves.65
B. Use and Abuse of Partnership Distributions
Congress quickly came to understand its error; the revenue
stakes in subchapter K were in fact high, and partnerships could not
be trusted to self-police. In the absence of equity-based provisions,
partnerships used a variety of techniques to structure distributions

62. Immediately before the distribution, A’s and B’s respective shares of Redacre’s built-in
gain were $30. After the distribution, the partnership no longer holds Redacre; hence, their shares
of the property’s tax appreciation would be zero.
63. It is, however, important to note that this shift is temporary, reversing itself on each
partner’s sale or liquidation of her partnership interest. Nonetheless, this type of income shifting,
and the resulting deferral effect, remain problematic because the offsetting allocations may not
occur for many years, if at all. The longer it takes to reverse the income shift, the more the
deferral effect begins to look like a permanent exemption from the federal income tax. William D.
Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113,
1124 (1974).
64. See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 65 (1954); S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 89 (1954); see also J.
Paul Jackson et al., A Proposed Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Partnerships
and Partners—American Law Institute Draft, 9 TAX L. REV. 109, 113 (1954) [hereinafter Jackson
et al., 1954 American Law Institute Draft]; J. Paul Jackson et al., The Internal Revenue Code of
1954: Partnerships, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 1183, 1183 (1954) [hereinafter Jackson et al., Internal
Revenue Code of 1954].
65. At the time of subchapter K’s codification, Congress was in fact concerned with
transactions designed to convert ordinary income into preferentially treated capital gains. As will
be discussed infra Part II.B.2, subchapter K’s original provisions did focus on preventing
improper character conversions. I.R.C. §§ 731(a)(2), 735, 751(b) (1954).
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that improperly reduced the partners’ aggregate tax burden in
violation of equitable norms. This subpart uses the ABC partnership
to explore three such abuses: income shifting, character conversions,
and income avoidance.66
1. Income Shifting
A distribution can be used to shift income among partners,
improperly altering each partner’s share of pre-distribution built-in
gain. To illustrate, let’s return to the previous example involving the
ABC partnership. This time, however, let’s assume that the
partnership holds inventory (“Inventory”) rather than Redacre, and
the partnership distributes the Inventory to C in partial liquidation of
her partnership interest.67 At the time of the distribution, the
Inventory has a fair market value of $100 and a basis of $10.
Neither C nor the partnership would recognize any gain on the
distribution, and C would take a basis of $10 in the Inventory.68 In
doing so, subchapter K’s distribution system would preserve the
Inventory’s $90 aggregate built-in gain for future recognition; if C
were to sell the property for its post-distribution fair market value of
$100, she would recognize a $90 gain.
Even so, this distribution would change the incidence of tax,
shifting $60 of income from A and B, the non-distributee partners, to
C, the distributee partner. Like the previous example, each partner’s
share of the Inventory’s pre-distribution built-in gain was $30.69 Yet
after the distribution, C would bear the tax burden for the entire $90
of gain. The distribution would thus absolve A and B of
responsibility for their respective $30 shares of the Inventory’s predistribution built-in gain. Assuming that A and B are subject to a
higher rate of tax than C, this income shift would produce a net tax
66. This subpart offers readers a simple introduction to the primary abuses involving
partnership distributions. It is important to note that subchapter K does include a variety of antiabuse provisions designed to prevent many of these abuses, and these provisions will be
discussed in greater detail infra Part II.C. For purposes of this subpart, however, I will assume
that subchapter K does not include any anti-abuse provisions. My goal here is simply to illustrate
the tax shelter opportunities created by a distribution system that is grounded in a nonrecognition
rule.
67. As noted, this subpart disregards subchapter K’s current smorgasbord of anti-abuse
provisions. Nonetheless, one such provision, section 751(b), would in fact apply to this
transaction. Section 751(b) will be discussed in greater detail infra Part II.C.3.
68. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 60.
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savings for the partners.70 More broadly, shifting income from high
bracket partners to low bracket partners benefits the partnership as a
whole by decreasing the aggregate tax liability associated with the
future sale of the distributed property. But it does so at the expense
of the public at large, depriving the federal government of tax
revenues.71
2. Character Conversions
A distribution can also be used to convert ordinary income into
preferentially treated capital gains. This type of transaction was
particularly popular during subchapter K’s early years when
individual income tax rates were as high as 91 percent, yet the capital
gains rate was only 25 percent.72 To the extent that subchapter K’s
original provisions affirmatively focused on equity, it was to address
this type of character converting distribution.73
Returning again to the ABC partnership’s distribution of the
Inventory, the transaction also involved an improper character
conversion. If the partnership had sold the Inventory instead of
distributing it to C, it would have recognized a $90 gain, and this
gain would have been ordinary.74 Once C takes possession of the
Inventory, however, the character of any gain recognized on a
subsequent sale would be determined based on C’s use of the
property. Assuming that C is not a dealer in Inventory, the property
would likely qualify as a capital asset.75 Any sale of the Inventory by
C for its then fair market value of $100 would thus result in a $90
capital gain.76
By converting a pre-distribution ordinary gain into a postdistribution capital gain, the partnership would reduce the tax rate
applicable to any gain recognized on the Inventory’s sale. Like
income shifting, character conversions reduce the partners’ aggregate
70. For an example of the benefit achieved through income shifting, see supra note 25.
71. As discussed supra note 63, this income shift is temporary, reversing itself on a partner’s
sale or liquidation of her partnership interest.
72. I.R.C. §§ 1(a) (providing tax rates for individuals), 1201(b) (providing capital gains rate
for individuals) (1954).
73. See infra note 80.
74. I.R.C. §§ 702(b), 1221(a)(1) (2006).
75. I.R.C. § 1221(a).
76. Subchapter K does in fact contain a series of anti-abuse provisions designed to prevent
this type of character conversion. Id. §§ 735(a), 751(b). For a discussion of these provisions, see
infra note 80 (section 735) and Part II.C.3 (section 751(b)).
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tax liability. Indeed, distributions often involve both of these abuses,
converting the character of a built-in gain and shifting it among the
partners. In these instances, subchapter K’s distribution system fails
to preserve both the amount and the character of the partners’
respective shares of the partnership’s pre-distribution built-in gain.
3. Income Avoidance
The final distribution-related abuse involves distributions that
are part of a coordinated plan to disguise taxable property
dispositions. In these transactions, a partner’s contribution of
property to the partnership is followed by a distribution of property
to the same partner. Although the contribution and distribution, taken
together, would otherwise effect a property disposition, subchapter K
treats both transactions as nonrecognition events, thereby deferring
the recognition of any built-in gain.77 By using the partnership as a
conduit, the partner is able to achieve a result often impossible
outside of subchapter K—a tax-free property disposition.
Returning to the ABC partnership, imagine that B owns
additional inventory in her individual capacity, and she wishes to sell
this property to the partnership. The additional inventory is worth
$200 and has a basis of $150, and B wants to avoid recognizing the
property’s $50 built-in gain on the disposition. Accordingly, B and
the partnership “disguise” this disposition as follows: B would first
contribute the additional inventory to the partnership, and the
partnership would subsequently distribute $200 of cash to B.78
Because both transactions are treated as nonrecognition events,
neither the contribution nor the distribution would trigger recognition
of the $50 built-in gain attributable to the additional inventory.79 This
77. Contributions to a partnership, like distributions from a partnership, are treated as
nonrecognition transactions under subchapter K. I.R.C. § 721(a). Neither the contributing partner
nor the partnership recognizes gain on the contribution of property to a partnership in exchange
for a partnership interest. Id. Any built-in gain in the contributed property is instead deferred for
future recognition on a subsequent sale of either the contributed property or the contributing
partner’s partnership interest. The preservation of this built-in gain is achieved through basis
adjustments at both the partner and the partnership level. Id. §§ 722 (contributing partner’s
outside basis), 723 (partnership’s basis in contributed property).
78. Like the aforementioned anti-abuse provisions addressing income and character
converting transactions, subchapter K also contains provisions that attempt to prevent this type of
disguised sale. Id. §§ 707(a)(2)(B), 737. For a discussion of these provisions, see infra notes 82
(section 707(a)(2)(B)) and 85 (section 737).
79. If B were to contribute the additional inventory to the partnership, neither she nor the
partnership would recognize any gain on the transaction. I.R.C. § 721(a). Instead, the $50 built-in
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coordinated transaction would thus allow B to avoid recognizing gain
on what is, in substance, a taxable property disposition.
C. Government Responses
Nonrecognition in partnership distributions proved problematic
from the outset, allowing partnerships to manipulate deferred built-in
gains to their partners’ advantage. When subchapter K was codified,
Congress considered character conversions to be its most pressing
concern and responded accordingly.80 Over time, however, the
difference between the capital gains rate and the highest individual
income tax rate shrank; hence, the danger associated with character
conversions diminished. At the same time, Congress came to
appreciate the tremendous public cost associated with income
shifting and avoidance.81
Throughout this period, Congress responded aggressively to
abusive distributions, enacting various anti-abuse provisions. A
gain would be preserved through a series of basis adjustments. Id. §§ 722, 723. To that end, B
would increase her outside basis by $150, from $170 to $320. Id. § 722. Likewise, the partnership
would take a basis of $150 in the additional inventory. Id. § 723. When the partnership then
distributes $200 in cash to B, the transaction would again be treated as a tax-free event: neither B
nor the partnership would recognize a gain. Id. § 731(a)(1), (b). B would adjust her outside basis
accordingly, reducing it from $320 to $120. Id. § 733.
80. See, e.g., Jackson et al., 1954 American Law Institute Draft, supra note 64, at 154.
Examples of subchapter K’s original character conversion-focused provisions include sections
731(a)(1), 735, and 751(b). I.R.C. §§ 731(a)(2), 735(a), 751(b) (1954). The section 751(b)
disproportionate distribution rule will be discussed in greater detail infra Part II.C.3. Section 735
deals with a distributee partner’s sale of property received in a distribution. If a partnership
distributes certain types of property to a partner that would generate ordinary income if sold by
the partnership, then the distributee partner’s subsequent sale of such property will also generate
ordinary income. I.R.C. § 735(a) (2006). The duration of this “taint” depends on the particular
type of “ordinary” asset distributed. Id. § 735(a)(1) (indefinite taint for assets treated as
“unrealized receivables,” as defined in section 751(c)), (a)(2) (five-year taint for assets treated as
“inventory,” as defined in section 751(d)). For a more detailed discussion of section 735, see
generally MCKEE ET AL., supra note 10, ¶ 20.02; WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 54, ¶
13.04.
Section 731(a)(2), in contrast, addresses the alternate side of character conversions,
preventing the conversion of a capital loss into a preferentially treated ordinary loss through a
complete liquidating distribution. I.R.C. § 731(a)(2). It applies to complete liquidating
distributions where the distributee partner receives a combination of cash and property that, if
sold by the partnership, would generate ordinary income. Id. In these instances, section 731(a)(2)
requires the distributee partner to recognize a loss equal to the excess of (1) the distributee
partner’s pre-distribution outside basis over (2) the sum of the basis that she takes in the
distributed property and the amount of any cash received in the distribution. Id. For a more
detailed discussion of section 731(a)(2), see generally MCKEE ET AL., supra note 10, ¶ 19.05;
WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 54, ¶ 13.02[2][c].
81. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., MEMORANDUM NO. 3, supra note 11, at 30–31; Andrews,
supra note 7, at 4.
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complex patchwork of provisions emerged to combat these sheltering
transactions. Although diverse in operation, these anti-abuse
provisions share two common characteristics: their design and their
rejection of nonrecognition. After discussing these elements, this
subpart will provide an example of subchapter K’s anti-abuse
provisions in operation, using the section 751(b) disproportionate
distribution rule as a guide through the maze of partnership
distributions.
1. Design
In large part, Congress’s desire to reconcile flexibility and
equity in partnership distributions was the driving force behind the
design of these anti-abuse provisions. The goal was to develop
provisions that targeted specific abuses without infringing on
legitimate partnership distributions. The result was narrowly tailored,
intricate provisions designed to pinpoint particular tax shelters
through a combination of mathematical rules and open-textured
standards.82 Put another way, these anti-abuse provisions were
terribly complicated.
At the same time, these provisions were often reactive,
combating the last tax shelter rather than the next tax shelter.
Congress perpetually found itself behind the tax shelter market,
drafting an ad hoc series of targeted responses instead of developing
a comprehensive, forward-thinking approach to abusive

82. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 707(a)(2)(B), 751(b). Section 751(b) will be discussed infra Part
II.C.3. The section 707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule provides that a contribution and distribution
will be recast as a taxable disposition between the partner and the partnership if, when considered
together, the two transactions are more properly characterized as a sale. I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B).
The determination of whether a contribution and distribution are, in substance, a sale is made by
using a standards-based approach. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(b)(2). A partnership is required to
consider all relevant facts and circumstances in making this determination, but the regulation
provides a list of ten factors that may lead to the conclusion that a coordinated contribution and
distribution are, in fact, a sale. Id. Of particular importance, these factors focus on whether the
partner’s receipt of the distribution was subject to the entrepreneurial risks of the partnership’s
operations. Id. In order to ease the burden of this standard, the regulation also includes two
rebuttable presumptions: (1) a contribution and distribution occurring within a two-year period
are presumed to be a disguised sale; and (2) a contribution and distribution occurring more than
two years apart are presumed to be independent transactions. Id. § 1.707–3(c)(1), (d). For a more
detailed discussion of the section 707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule, see generally MCKEE ET AL.,
supra note 10, ¶ 14.02[3][B]; WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 54, ¶ 13.02[7].
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distributions.83 As a result, these anti-abuse provisions lack systemic
coherence and offer too little guidance for law-abiding partnerships.
2. Erosion of Nonrecognition
Operationally, the last half-century of anti-abuse provisions have
largely relied on recognition rules that require the distributee partner
or the partnership to recognize gain at the time of distribution. By
cutting off deferral at distribution, these anti-abuse provisions
eliminate the built-in gains necessary to shift income, convert
character, or avoid gain recognition. Although their approaches to
recognition vary, all of these anti-abuse provisions strive to recast the
underlying transaction in a manner that better reflects its commercial
substance. Some provisions, such as the section 751(b)
disproportionate distribution rule and the section 707(a)(2)(B)
disguised sale rule, treat the distribution as a taxable sale or exchange
between the partnership and the distributee partner.84 In these
transactions, the recharacterized distribution may trigger gain
recognition by both the partnership and the distributee partner. Other
provisions adopt a narrower approach, only requiring the distributee
partner to recognize gain.85 In these instances, the recognized gain is

83. In 1994, IRS Deputy Associate Chief Counsel Monte Jackel described this problem in
the following manner: “We’re talking about the world of today. There’s been too many
transactions that are too close to the line—results and opinions about the interaction of rules
which we believe are inappropriate . . . . We need help in crafting a rule to police the partnership
area. We have decided as an institution that we are not going to pursue these problems on a
case-by-case basis anymore.” Lee A. Sheppard, Partnership Antiabuse Rule: Dirty Minds Meet
Mrs. Gregory, 64 TAX NOTES 295, 295 (1994).
84. For a discussion of the section 751(b) disproportionate distribution rule, see infra Part
II.C.3. Likewise, for a discussion of the section 707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule, see supra note
82.
85. I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B), 737. Section 704(c)(1)(B) was designed to curtail transactions
where the partnership is used as a “mixing bowl” to shift a built-in gain attributable to contributed
property from the contributing partner to another partner. To that end, if a partner contributes
property to a partnership and, within the seven-year period following the contribution, the
contributed property is distributed to another partner, section 704(c)(1)(B) requires the
contributing partner to recognize the pre-contribution gain. Id. § 704(c)(1)(B)(i). For a detailed
discussion of the section 704(c)(1)(B) mixing bowl rule, see generally MCKEE ET AL., supra note
10, ¶ 11.04[4]; WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE ET AL., supra note 54, ¶ 13.02[6][b].
In contrast, the section 737 mixing bowl rule operates as a backstop to the section
707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule, which is discussed supra note 82. It applies to a partner that
contributes property to a partnership and receives a distribution of different property during the
succeeding seven-year period. I.R.C. § 737(a). If applicable, section 737 requires a partner to
recognize a gain that is intended to approximate the gain that she would have recognized on a
taxable disposition of the property previously contributed to the partnership. For a detailed
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typically computed by reference to a hypothetical sale of partnership
property at its fair market value immediately before the
distribution.86 To the extent that the partnership would have allocated
any hypothetical gain to the distributee partner, these anti-abuse
provisions require her to recognize such gain at the time of
distribution.87
3. An Example: Section 751(b)
Section 751(b) is the oldest and most troublesome of Congress’s
recognition-based anti-abuse provisions, recasting “disproportionate”
distributions as taxable exchanges between the partnership and the
distributee partner. Congress originally designed section 751(b) to
combat character conversions, but over time it has become a bulwark
against a diverse array of abuses, including income shifting and
excessive deferral.88 Despite its expanded role in fighting abusive
distributions, section 751(b) exists in virtually its original form.89 It
discussion of the section 737 mixing bowl rule, see generally MCKEE ET AL., supra note 10, ¶
19.08; WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 54, ¶ 13.02[1][a][v].
86. I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B)(i), 737(b).
87. Id.; see also § 731(c) (treating marketable securities as money for purposes of
determining the tax consequences to a distributee partner).
88. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 71 (1954); S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 98–99 (1954); H.R. REP.
NO. 83-2543, at 64–65 (1954) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5280, 5325–26; see
also, e.g., AM. LAW INST., SUBCHAPTER K PROJECT, supra note 11, at 49; Andrews, supra note
7, at 4 (“The original purpose for this provision had primarily to do with the distinction between
capital gain and ordinary income rates, more than timing of gain recognition, but it currently
functions to set an important, though inadequate limit on unreasonable postponement of tax.”).
Alongside distribution-related character concerns, section 751(b) originally reflected parallel
concerns regarding the treatment of sales of partnership interests. From an economic perspective,
a complete liquidating distribution of cash to a retiring partner is the equivalent of a sale of the
retiring partner’s interest. The only difference is the identity of the purchaser—the remaining
partners, in the case of a complete liquidating distribution, versus a third party, in the case of a
sale. When subchapter K was originally codified, it contained a series of provisions designed to
prevent character conversions through sales of partnership interests. I.R.C. §§ 741, 751(a) (1954).
In order to prevent partnerships from avoiding these “collapsible partnership” provisions through
the use of distributions, Subchapter K’s original distribution system required comparable
provisions. Section 751(b), it was hoped, would perform that function. See, e.g., Paul Little,
Partnership Distributions Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (First Installment), 10 TAX
LAW REV. 161, 182–83 (1954). For an excellent history of section 751(b), see generally MCKEE
ET AL., supra note 10, ¶ 21.02[2]; Burke, supra note 11, at 680–93; Hanna, supra note 11, at 469–
85.
89. I.R.C. § 751(b) (1954); Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(b) (1956). In 2006, the Treasury requested
comments regarding the possible revision of section 751(b). I.R.S. Notice 2006-14, 2006-1 C.B.
498. In explaining the rationale behind its review of section 751(b), it noted that “the current
regulations under Section 751(b) were published in 1956 and have not been amended to reflect
significant changes in subchapter K and in the operations of contemporary partnerships.” Id. at
499. Eight years later, the Treasury has yet to issue proposed regulations under section 751(b).
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thus reflects an erstwhile era of partnership distributions, failing to
account for the seismic shifts in modern partnerships and partnership
tax shelters.
Section 751(b) first requires a partnership to divide its assets
into two categories—“hot assets” and “cold assets.” Broadly
speaking, hot assets are assets that would generate ordinary income if
sold by the partnership, such as inventory and accounts receivable;
everything else is a cold asset.90 To illustrate this division, let’s
return to the ABC partnership. Let’s also assume that the partnership
has three assets: $200 in cash, investment property (“Blueacre”) with
a fair market value and basis of $300, and Inventory with a fair
market value of $100 and a basis of $10. The Inventory is treated as
a hot asset under section 751(b) because its sale by the partnership
would result in ordinary income.91 The cash and Blueacre, in
contrast, are cold assets.
Once the partnership has properly divided its assets, it must
determine if a particular distribution is “disproportionate,” thus
triggering section 751(b)’s recognition rule. A distribution is
disproportionate if the distributee partner receives more than her
share of the partnership’s hot assets or cold assets, in each case, as
measured by their gross asset value.92 If disproportionate, section
751(b) recasts the distribution as a taxable exchange between the
distributee partner and the partnership.93
Consider again the ABC partnership. Assume that C wishes to
retire from the partnership; hence, the partnership transfers $200 in

90. I.R.C. § 751(b). Hot assets include two categories of assets—unrealized receivables and
substantially appreciated inventory. Id. Unrealized receivables are any rights, not previously
included in income under the taxpayer’s method of accounting, to payment for services rendered
or payment for goods delivered to the extent that such payment would not be treated as an amount
received from the disposition of a capital asset. Id. § 751(c). Inventory, in contrast, is defined
broadly to include (1) property that would be included in a taxpayer’s inventory if on hand at the
close of the taxable year; (2) any other property of the partnership that, if disposed of, would not
be considered a capital asset or section 1231 property; and (3) any other property of the
partnership that, if held by the distributee partner, would fall within this definition of “inventory.”
Id. § 751(d). Inventory, in turn, is substantially appreciated if its aggregate fair market value
exceeds 120 percent of its aggregate basis to the partnership. Id. § 751(b)(3)(A).
91. I.R.C. § 751(d)(1). The Inventory falls within the statutory definition of “inventory”
because it would be included in inventory if the partnership held it at the end of the taxable year.
Id. Additionally, the Inventory is treated as substantially appreciated inventory. Id.
§ 751(b)(3)(A). Its fair market value ($120) exceeds 120 percent of its basis ($10).
92. Id. § 751(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g), exs. 2, 3.
93. I.R.C. § 751(b).
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cash to her in a complete liquidating distribution.94 This distribution
would be disproportionate because C receives only cold assets—
cash—in complete liquidation of her partnership interest. Put another
way, C’s interest in the partnership’s hot assets, as determined by
their gross asset value, would decrease from $33.33 to $0.95 Section
751(b) would therefore recharacterize the distribution as an exchange
between C and the partnership, with C exchanging her one-third
share of the Inventory for a larger share of the partnership’s cash.96
To implement this exchange, section 751(b) breaks a
distribution into three fictional transactions. Because the
disproportionate distribution is recast as an exchange between the
distributee partner and the partnership, the distributee partner first
needs to obtain the property that she will be deemed to exchange for
a portion of the property actually distributed to her. In the first
imaginary transaction, the partnership thus distributes this property—
the property that she relinquishes in the actual distribution—to the
distributee partner.97 In the previous example, section 751(b) would
treat C as if she received a distribution of one-third of the
94. Immediately before this distribution, the partnership had the following balance sheet:
Assets

Basis

Value

Capital

Basis

Value

Cash

200

200

A

170

200

Inventory

10

100

B

170

200

Blueacre

300

300

C

170

200

Total

510

600

510

600

95. Id. § 751(b)(1)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g), ex. 2. Immediately before the distribution,
the partnership held Inventory with a fair market value of $100 and a basis of $10. As a one-third
partner, C would be treated as having a one-third interest in the Inventory, with a fair market
value of $33.33 ($100 fair market value * 1/3 interest) and a basis of $3.33 ($10 basis * 1/3).
96. More generally, when a distribution reduces a partner’s share of the partnership’s hot
assets, section 751(b) treats the partner as if she exchanged all or a portion of her share of the
partnership’s hot assets for a larger share of the partnership’s cold assets. I.R.C. § 751(b)(1)(B).
Conversely, when a distribution increases a partner’s share of the partnership’s hot assets, section
751(b) treats the partner as if she exchanged all or a portion of her share of the partnership’s cold
assets for a larger share of the partnership’s hot assets. Id. § 751(b)(1)(A).
In this transaction, C is also exchanging her one-third share of Blueacre for an increased
share of the partnership’s cash. This type of cold asset exchange is beyond section 751(b)’s scope
because it does not involve an “exchange” of assets of differing character. It can, however,
present income shifting concerns.
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(b)(3)(iii), (g), ex. 2(d)(1).
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partnership’s Inventory, with a fair market value of $33.33 and a
basis of $3.33.98 Neither C nor the partnership would recognize a
gain on this first-step distribution.99 C would instead take a basis of
$3.33 in the Inventory and would adjust her outside basis
accordingly, reducing it from $170 to $166.67.100
The second fictional transaction is the exchange, where the
distributee partner exchanges the property received in the first-step
distribution for a portion of the property involved in the actual
distribution.101 Returning to the ABC partnership, C would thus
transfer the Inventory back to the partnership and, in exchange, she
would receive $33.33 in cash from the partnership.102 C would
recognize a $30 ordinary gain on this exchange.103 In contrast, the
partnership would recognize no gain, treating the transaction as a
cash purchase of the Inventory. It would, however, take a basis of
$33.33 in this “newly acquired” Inventory, thus increasing its
aggregate basis in the Inventory from $6.67 to $40.104
98. See supra note 95.
99. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1), (b).
100. Id. §§ 732(a)(1), 733. Immediately after this first imaginary transaction, the partnership
would have the following balance sheet:
Assets

Basis

Value

Capital

Basis

Value

Cash

200

200

A

170

200

Inventory

6.67

66.67

B

170

200

Blueacre

300

300

C

166.67

166.67

Total

506.67

566.67

506.67

566.67

At the partnership level, the balance sheet would also reflect the Inventory distributed to C in this
first-step fictional transaction. Recall that the partnership held Inventory with a fair market value
of $100 and a basis of $10 before the distribution. After the distribution, the partnership holds
Inventory with a fair market value of $66.67 ($100 pre-distribution fair market value of Inventory
less $33.33 fair market value of Inventory distributed) and a basis of $6.67 ($10 pre-distribution
basis of Inventory less $3.33 basis of Inventory distributed). Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g), ex. 2(e)(2).
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(b)(3)(i), (g), ex. 2(c).
102. That is, C would be treated as if she sold Inventory with a fair market value of $33.33
and a basis of $3.33 to the partnership for cash. The partnership, in contrast, would be treated as if
it purchased Inventory for $33.33 in cash.
103. I.R.C. § 1001; Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(b)(3)(iii), (g), ex. 2(d)(1). The $30 of gain
recognized by C reflects the difference between the Inventory’s purchase price ($33.33) and C’s
basis in the Inventory ($3.33).
104. I.R.C. § 1012; Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g), ex. (e)(1). The partnership had a basis of $6.67
in the portion of the Inventory that was not distributed to C in the first-step distribution. When
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The third imaginary transaction represents the proportionate
element of the actual transaction, with the partnership making a
distribution of the remainder of the property actually distributed to
the partner.105 Returning to the ABC partnership, this final
transaction would involve a $166.67 cash distribution to C. She has
already received $33.33 in cash from the partnership; hence, an
additional $166.67 is necessary to complete the actual $200 cash
distribution. Neither C nor the partnership would recognize a gain on
this distribution, and C’s outside basis would be reduced to zero.106
As this example illustrates, section 751(b) is unbelievably
complicated. It involves a total of seven steps, three fictional
transactions, and the artificial division of the partnership’s assets into

this basis is added to the $33.33 cost basis taken in the “exchanged” Inventory, the partnership
would have a total basis of $40 in the Inventory. Immediately after the distribution, the
partnership would have the following balance sheet:
Assets

Basis

Value

Capital

Basis

Value

Cash

166.67

166.67

A

170

200

Inventory

40

100

B

170

200

Blueacre

300

300

C

166.67

166.67

Total

506.67

566.67

506.67

566.67

This fictional exchange has no effect on C’s partnership interest, only involving her interest in the
Inventory distributed in the first-step transaction. Accordingly, the fair market value and basis of
C’s partnership interest would remain unchanged.
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g), ex. 2(d)(2).
106. I.R.C. §§ 731(a)–(b), 733; Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g), ex. 2(d)(2), (e)(2). Immediately after
this final step, the partnership would have the following balance sheet:
Assets

Basis

Value

Capital

Basis

Value

Inventory

40

100

A

170

200

Blueacre

300

300

B

170

200

Total

340

400

340

400
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hot and cold categories.107 And this example—a complete liquidating
distribution—is the easy case.108
Nonetheless, it is important to note that, in this example, section
751(b) would correctly preserve the amount and character of each
partner’s share of the partnership’s pre-distribution built-in gains.
And it would do so by recasting the distribution as a taxable
exchange between the partnership and the distributee partner. Before
the distribution, each partner’s share of the Inventory’s
pre-distribution built-in gain was $30, and this gain was ordinary.109
Section 751(b) would force C to recognize her share of this predistribution ordinary gain, thereby preventing the distribution from
shifting the built-in gain or converting its character.110 In contrast,
A’s and B’s shares of the Inventory’s pre-distribution built-in gain
would be preserved for future recognition. A and B would now be
equal partners in a partnership holding Inventory with a fair market
value of $100 and a basis of $40. A subsequent disposition of the
Inventory would thus generate a $60 ordinary gain, which the
partnership would allocate equally between A and B, $30 each.
Even so, section 751(b) is not a panacea. It does not always
succeed in preserving the amount and character of the partners’
shares of pre-distribution built-in gains. In fact, section 751(b), like
107. See supra note 10.
108. In both theory and practice, partial liquidating distributions are the most challenging type
of distributions. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., MEMORANDUM NO. 3, supra note 11, at 55–58;
Andrews, supra note 7, at 57; Burke, supra note 11, at 710–17.
109. Before the distribution, the Inventory had a fair market value of $100 and a basis of $10.
If the partnership had sold the Inventory rather than distributing it to C, it would have recognized
a $90 ordinary gain on the sale. I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1221(a). This gain, in turn, would have been
allocated equally among the partners, $30 each. Id. § 704(b).
110. Consider the tax consequences of this distribution if section 751(b) did not apply. The
partnership would distribute $200 in cash to C in complete liquidation of her partnership interest.
C would recognize a gain of $30 on the distribution because the amount of cash distributed
($200) is greater than her outside basis ($170). Id. § 731(a)(1). This gain, however, would be
treated as a capital gain. Id. § 731(a). Accordingly, the distribution would effect a character
conversion, transforming ordinary income into a capital gain. Likewise, the distribution would
increase A’s and B’s respective shares of the Inventory’s built-in gain. Before and after the
distribution, there would be a $90 built-in gain reflected in the Inventory ($100 fair market value
less $10 basis). If the partnership had sold the Inventory for its fair market value prior to the
distribution, the three partners would have shared the resulting $90 gain equally, $30 each. After
the distribution, C would no longer be a partner; therefore, A and B would share the resulting $90
gain equally, $45 each. The distribution would thus increase A’s and B’s respective shares of the
Inventory’s built-in gain by $15.
In addition to section 751(b), subchapter K has another, elective mechanism designed to
address this problem of “lost” basis and the resulting increase in the remaining partners’ shares of
pre-distribution built-in gain. For a detailed discussion of this mechanism, see infra note 121.
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many of subchapter K’s anti-abuse provisions, often works quite
poorly. The next subpart addresses this problem and its impact on
partnership distributions.
D. Partnership Distributions Today
Partnership distributions today are flawed in both theory and
practice. The problem with partnership distributions is first
principles—the tax treatment of distributions, especially liquidating
distributions, does not reflect the commercial reality of these
transactions. Congress and the Treasury have thus spent the last
half-century trying to manage this disconnect, attempting to combat
the resulting tax shelters while preserving subchapter K’s flexibility.
Yet these efforts have largely failed: the law of partnership
distributions is now complicated, inequitable, and unstable. Partner
compliance, in turn, is declining at both extremes of the partnership
spectrum, with well-intentioned partnerships struggling to
understand subchapter K and sheltering partnerships finding
opportunity in its dysfunctionality.
1. The Commercial Reality Gap
There is a deep divide between subchapter K’s treatment of
partnership distributions and their commercial reality. As previously
discussed, partnerships make distributions for myriad reasons, and
their effects on a partnership and the relationship among its partners
vary accordingly.111 On one hand, operating distributions have very
little impact on a partnership. The partners receive a proportionate
share of the partnership’s previously taxed income; hence, their
respective interests in the partnership remain unchanged. On another
hand, liquidating distributions are economically transformative
events, where a partner terminates all or a portion of her investment
in the partnership.
Yet all distributions are treated the same for tax purposes,
subject to a singular nonrecognition-based set of tax provisions. In
doing so, subchapter K elevates form over substance, focusing on the
formal trait shared by these distributions—the transfer of cash or
property from partnership to partner—instead of the commercial
substance of these economically diverse transactions. Under this
111. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
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uniform approach, form thus masks the foundational divide between
operating distributions and liquidating distributions. By
presumptively treating all distributions as nonrecognition
transactions, subchapter K mistreats those distributions that are
economically significant, namely, complete and partial liquidating
distributions.
Simply put, grounding the tax treatment of liquidating
distributions in a nonrecognition rule is inconsistent with the
commercial reality of these transactions. As a general matter,
nonrecognition is appropriate when a taxpayer’s investment in an
enterprise is continuing.112 The classic example is a like-kind
exchange.113 If a taxpayer were to exchange a real estate investment
in Wisconsin for a similar real estate investment in Pennsylvania,
nonrecognition would likely be proper because the taxpayer’s
investment is continuing, albeit in a slightly modified form. The
taxpayer would not be taxed on any built-in gain in the Wisconsin
property; instead, the gain would be deferred for future recognition
on her sale of the Pennsylvania property.114 If, however, the taxpayer
sold her real estate investment in Wisconsin for cash or exchanged it
for an entirely different kind of property, like a helicopter,
nonrecognition would no longer be appropriate. Here, the taxpayer
would be terminating her real estate investment and should therefore
recognize any built-in gain in the Wisconsin property, consistent
with fundamental tax principals.115
Similarly, liquidating distributions involve the termination of a
partner’s investment in a partnership. In these transactions, the
distributee partner receives cash or property from the partnership
and, in exchange, relinquishes all or a portion of her interest in the
partnership and its property.116 The liquidating distribution thus

112. See generally BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 44.1 (3d ed. 1999 & Supp. III 2004); Karen C. Burke, Disguised
Sales Between Partners and Partnerships: Section 707 and the Forthcoming Regulations, 63 IND.
L.J. 489, 522–29 (1988); David R. Keyser, A Theory of Nonrecognition Under an Income Tax:
The Case of Partnership Formation, 5 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 269, 279–85 (1986).
113. I.R.C. § 1031(a).
114. Id.
115. Id. § 1001.
116. This is true whether one thinks of the partnership as an aggregate of its partners or an
entity separate and distinct from them. Under the aggregate view of partnerships, the distributee
partner would be treated as if she relinquished her direct interest in each individual item of
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fundamentally alters the nature of the partnership, closing a chapter
for the historic partnership and opening a new chapter for the
reconstituted partnership. From this vantage, the current law’s
nonrecognition rule fails to capture the substantive impact of
liquidating distributions, treating them as continuations, rather than
terminations, of a partner’s investment in a partnership.
Of equal importance, property distributions mark the termination
of the partnership’s investment in the distributed property. If one
thinks of the partnership as an entity separate from its partners, then
the partnership itself is relinquishing its investment in property
through the distribution. Likewise, if one disregards the partnership
and thinks of the partners as direct co-owners of its property, then
each partner would be treated as terminating her investment in her
respective share of the distributed property.117 Considered in this
light, nonrecognition is again inappropriate, mischaracterizing the
substance of the distribution transaction.118
2. The Ripple Effect
These theoretical gaps in the treatment of distributions have
created practical challenges for subchapter K. Like all of the federal
income tax, subchapter K is grounded in the notion that the tax
consequences of a transaction should match the corresponding
economic consequences.119 When the tax treatment of a transaction
deviates from this equitable notion, partnerships often behave
opportunistically in pursuit of an improper tax advantage. The
partnership property in the distribution. Under the entity view of partnerships, in contrast, the
distributee partner would be treated as if she relinquished her interest in the partnership itself.
117. In this instance, however, the aggregate theory of partnerships raises a complication. If
each partner were treated as if she directly owned her proportionate interest in each item of
partnership property, then the distributee partner would already own a portion of the property that
she receives in the liquidating distribution. To the extent of this portion of the distributed
property, the liquidating distribution arguably has no effect, simply transferring property to the
distributee partner that she already owns. Put another way, the distributee partner’s investment is
continuing, not terminating with respect to this portion of the distributed property. One might
argue that nonrecognition is thus appropriate, at least for this portion of the larger transaction.
This issue will be discussed infra note 157.
118. Indeed, the economic treatment of liquidating distributions, as evidenced by the partners’
capital accounts, reflects the transformative effect of these transactions. As previously discussed,
a distribution is treated as a recognition event for capital account purposes. See supra notes 41
and 45. Of equal importance, the partnership may elect to rebook all of its assets in connection
with a distribution in partial or complete liquidation of a partner’s partnership interest. See supra
note 54.
119. See supra notes 21–27 and accompanying text.
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government, in turn, is forced to respond with technical anti-abuse
provisions. The result is discord in one of subchapter K’s most
ubiquitous transactions.
a. Complexity
The complexity of partnership distributions was perhaps
inevitable, when considered in light of Congress’s dual commitment
to flexibility and equity. Reconciling these goals required a
distinctive rulemaking design: one that was targeted, technical, and
terribly intricate.120 And this model is evident in the anti-abuse
provisions that Congress layered into subchapter K’s distribution
system.121
Notwithstanding their shared design, these anti-abuse provisions
are not homogenous. On the contrary, all of these provisions are
independently complicated, and their complexities are distinctive.
Congress individualized each provision in order to target a particular

120. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
121. It is also evident in the elective provisions that overlay partnership distributions. As
previously discussed, partnerships are permitted to rebook all of their assets for capital account
purposes in connection with partial and complete liquidating distributions. See supra note 54.
Additionally, subchapter K contains elective provisions designed to address basis mismatches
created by partnership distributions. I.R.C. §§ 734(b), 754 (2006). These basis mismatches arise
in two circumstances: (1) when the distributee partner recognizes a gain or a loss on a
distribution; and (2) when the distributee partner takes a basis in the distributed property that
differs from the partnership’s pre-distribution basis in the property. In these instances, the
partnership’s basis in its remaining property, which is not ordinarily adjusted to reflect a
distribution, no longer reflects the remaining partners’ shares of pre-distribution built-in gain. Id.
§ 734(a). As a result, these partners will recognize too much or too little gain on the partnership’s
subsequent sale of its property. To ameliorate this problem, Congress permits partnerships to
elect to adjust the basis of their remaining property following distributions that trigger these
inequitable basis mismatches. Id. § 734(b). A partnership is permitted to increase the basis of its
remaining assets if a partner recognizes a gain on a distribution or takes basis in the distributed
property that is less than the partnership’s pre-distribution basis in the property. Id. § 734(b)(1).
Likewise, if a partner recognizes a loss on a distribution or takes a basis in the distributed
property that is greater than the partnership’s basis in the property, the partnership is permitted to
decrease the basis of its remaining assets accordingly. Id. § 734(b)(2). Additionally, Congress
mandates this type of negative basis adjustment when the distribution involves a substantial basis
reduction. Id. § 734(b). If a distributee partner recognizes a loss in excess of $250,000 or the basis
she takes in the distributed property exceeds the partnership’s pre-distribution basis by more than
$250,000, then the partnership is required to reduce the basis of its remaining property. Id.
§ 734(b), (d)(1). As noted, this treatment is elective in all other instances. Id. § 754. Once a
partnership makes this election, however, it applies to all distributions, as well as certain sales of
partnership interests. Id. For a more detailed discussion of these basis adjustments and their many
challenges, see generally MCKEE ET AL., supra note 10, ¶ 24; WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra
note 54, ¶ 13.05; Howard Abrams, The Section 734(b) Basis Adjustment Needs Repair, 57 TAX
LAW. 343 (2004); Andrews, supra note 7.
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abuse without infringing on legitimate partnership distributions. To
that end, these provisions all implement their recognition-based
approach differently: some, like section 751(b), rely on a notional
exchange between partner and partnership; and others, like the
section 704(c)(1)(B) mixing bowl rule, rely on a hypothetical sale of
partnership assets.122
Their operational mechanics also vary, with each provision
using different statutory tools to combat a particular abuse. As
previously discussed, section 751(b) is grounded in technical rules
that require a partnership to navigate seven steps and three imaginary
transactions in recasting a disproportionate distribution.123 In
contrast, the section 707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule relies on an
open-textured standard to determine whether a contribution and
distribution should be treated as a sale.124 The section 737 mixing
bowl rule follows a third approach, turning on specialized
terminology, such as “net pre-contribution gain,” to prevent income
avoidance through a coordinated contribution and distribution.125
These varied mechanics, in turn, ripple through each anti-abuse
provision, often requiring customized basis adjustments and
character rules at both the partner and partnership level.126 Together,

122. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 10.
124. See supra note 82.
125. I.R.C. § 737(b). When section 737 applies to a distribution, the distributee partner is
required to recognize gain in an amount equal to the lesser of (1) the partner’s net precontribution gain and (2) the difference between the fair market value of the distributed property
and the partner’s outside basis immediately before the distribution. Id. § 737(a). A distributee
partner’s “net pre-contribution gain” is the amount of gain that the partner would recognize under
section 704(c)(1)(B) if any property she contributed to the partnership in the preceding seven-year
period were distributed to another partner. Id. § 737(b).
126. When a partner or partnership recognizes gain under any of these anti-abuse provisions,
the character of this gain must be determined. To that end, many of these anti-abuse provisions
include special provisions governing how such character determinations are to be made. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B)(ii) (character determined by a hypothetical sale), 737(a) (character
determined by reference to proportionate character of the net pre-contribution gain); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.751-1(b)(2)(iii), (3)(ii) (character determined by reference to the character of the property
relinquished in the exchange). Similarly, these recognized gains often trigger basis adjustments.
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B)(iii) (basis adjustments to contributed property and contributing
partner’s outside basis), 737(c) (basis adjustments to contributed property and contributing
partner’s outside basis); Treas. Reg. § 1.731-2(f) (basis adjustment to marketable securities
distributed to a partner). In addition, section 751(b) requires the partnership to make basis
adjustments in connection with each of its three fictional transactions. Treas. Reg. § 1.7511(b)(2), (3).
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this operational diversity forms an additional layer of complexity for
partnerships making distributions to their partners.
Even so, the most formidable aspect of subchapter K’s
distribution system is the system itself. The sheer number of
provisions governing distributions is overwhelming to many, if not
most, partnerships, especially when coupled with the provisions’
individual complexities. Navigating this system thus requires time,
energy, and resources, all of which are often scarce. Indeed,
complexity has made it virtually impossible for increasing numbers
of partnerships to understand and apply subchapter K’s distribution
system.
b. Inequity
One might willingly tolerate some complexity in subchapter K’s
distribution system if it effectively combated abusive transactions.
Unfortunately, this has not been the case; partnership distributions
remain inequitable, failing to tax partners based on their relative
circumstances.
A principle source of the inequity in partnership distributions is
the system’s nonrecognition premise. Without the deferral that
nonrecognition affords, much of the character conversion, income
shifting, and income avoidance endemic to partnership distributions
would not exist. Yet the anti-abuse provisions that Congress adopted
to address these abuses have proven counterproductive, not
achieving their equitable goals but contributing mightily to the legal
complexity of partnership taxation.
Just as design contributed to the distribution system’s
complexity, it also contributed to its inequity. As previously
discussed, Congress narrowly tailored subchapter K’s anti-abuse
provisions in order to target particular tax shelters without impeding
legitimate partnership transactions.127 For example, many of these
anti-abuse provisions apply for a finite number of years: two in the
case of the section 707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule; and seven in the
case of the section 704(c)(1)(B) and 737 mixing bowl rules.128
127. See supra Part II.C.1.
128. I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B) (applies when property is contributed to the partnership and then
distributed to another partner within the following seven-year period), 737(a)–(b) (applies when
property is distributed to a partner that contributed property to the partnership during the sevenyear period preceding the distribution); Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(c)(1), (d) (1992) (rebuttable
presumptions that (1) a contribution and a distribution to the same partner that occur within a
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Similarly, some anti-abuse provisions only apply once a distribution
exceeds a specified monetary threshold.129 In both instances,
however, these statutory limitations impair the overall efficacy of
subchapter K’s efforts to prevent abusive distributions. Transactions
structured outside these limitations continue unaffected, and
partnerships are perhaps even emboldened by the expressive function
of government line drawing.
Of equal importance, many of these anti-abuse provisions are
technically flawed. Section 751(b), for example, is replete with such
flaws. In fairness, this was probably inevitable, as no single
provision could be expected to combat all the abuses made possible
by nonrecognition. Yet section 751(b)’s technical defects make it a
particularly ill-suited defender of equity in partnership
distributions.130 Partnership tax scholars have thus dedicated
countless hours and pages to cataloguing section 751(b)’s flaws.131 I
do not propose to recount the entire bill of particulars, but one

two-year period are a disguised sale and (2) a contribution and a distribution to same partner that
do not occur within a two-year period are not a disguised sale).
129. For instance, section 751(b)’s definition of “hot assets” only includes inventory, as
defined in section 751(d), if it is substantially appreciated. I.R.C. § 751(b)(3)(A) (inventory will
be considered “substantially appreciated” if its aggregate fair market value exceeds 120 percent of
its aggregate basis); see also id. § 734(b), (d)(1) (requiring mandatory basis adjustment when the
distributee partner recognizes a loss in excess of $250,000 or the partner’s basis in the distributed
property exceeds the partnership’s pre-distribution basis in the property by more than $250,000).
130. Put another way, section 751(b), as currently drafted, does not succeed in preventing the
abuses it was designed to combat. Nonetheless, the theory underlying section 751(b)—that
liquidating distributions are taxable exchanges—is sound. Indeed, as will be discussed infra Part
III.B, it may be the most sound aspect of subchapter K’s distribution regime.
131. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF TAXATION, COMMENTS CONCERNING NOTICE
2006-14, reprinted in 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 82-22 (Apr. 25, 2007); Andrews, supra note 7, at
45–55; Burke, supra note 11, at 680–86; Noël B. Cunnngham, Needed Reform: Tending the Sick
Rose, 47 TAX LAW REV. 77, 89–104 (1991); N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, REPORT
RESPONDING TO NOTICE 2006-14 RELATING TO THE TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP
DISTRIBUTIONS UNDER SECTION 751(B), reprinted in 2006 TAX NOTES TODAY 230-8 (Nov. 28,
2006); Yin, supra note 5, at 233–38. A sampling of section 751(b)’s many technical flaws, as
identified by these scholars, includes: (1) the definition of “hot asset”; (2) the “substantial
appreciation” requirement for inventory; (3) the failure to extend section 751(b) treatment to
depreciable assets; (4) the use of an exchange model, rather than a sale model, in determining the
tax consequences of a disproportionate distribution; (5) the need to identify the assets
hypothetically distributed to the partner in anticipation of the deemed exchange; and (6) the use of
gross asset value to determine whether a distribution is disproportionate, which will be discussed
herein. Id. As discussed supra note 89, the Treasury is considering its options for reforming
section 751(b). I.R.S. Notice 2006-14, 2006-1 C.B. 498. In particular, it has requested comments
on revisions designed to improve the regulation’s method of determining whether a distribution is
disproportionate and to streamline the tax consequences associated with a recharacterized
distribution. Id. § 3.
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example might prove useful in illustrating how section 751(b) is its
own worst enemy.
Section 751(b)’s triggering mechanism is a perfect example of
these flaws. As previously discussed, section 751(b) applies when a
distributee partner receives a disproportionate share of a
partnership’s ordinary, or hot, assets.132 To this end, each partner’s
share of the partnership’s hot assets is determined based on gross
asset value.133 If a partner holding a one-third partnership interest
receives a distribution in complete liquidation of her partnership
interest, she must receive one-third of the partnership’s hot assets, as
determined by reference to their fair market value, in the distribution.
If she does not, the distribution will trigger section 751(b).
To illustrate, let’s return to the ABC equal partnership. This
time, however, let’s assume that the partnership holds three assets—
Blueacre, Inventory #1, and Inventory #2. C wishes to retire from the
partnership and, at this time, the partnership has the following
balance sheet:
Assets

Basis

Value

Capital

Basis

Value

Inventory #1
Inventory #2
Blueacre

100
50
300

100
200
300

A
B
C

150
150
150

200
200
200

Total

450

600

450

600

To accommodate C’s decision, the partnership distributes a portion
of Blueacre with a fair market value of $100 and Inventory #1 to C in
complete liquidation of her partnership interest. Under section
751(b)’s triggering mechanism, this distribution would not be
considered disproportionate. Before the distribution, the
partnership’s hot assets were worth $300, and the partners shared this

132. See supra notes 92 and accompanying text.
133. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g), exs. 2, 3.
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aggregate hot asset value equally, $100 each.134 C received Inventory
#1 in the distribution when its fair market value was $100. She
would thus have received exactly her share of the partnership’s hot
assets, as determined by their gross asset value, in the transaction,
hence avoiding the section 751(b) disproportionate distribution
rule.135
Herein lies a problem. This distribution would be abusive,
converting the character of C’s built-in gain from ordinary to capital
and shifting income among the partners. Prior to the distribution,
there was a $150 built-in gain in Inventory #2; if the partnership had
sold the property, it would have recognized a $150 ordinary gain.136
In turn, each partner’s share of this ordinary gain would have been
$50.137 Inventory #1, in contrast, had no built-in gain because its fair
market value equaled its basis.
The distribution in complete liquidation of C’s interest would
change these shares, yet section 751(b) would treat the transaction as
a proportionate distribution, failing to respond to the resulting
inequities. Consider the tax consequences to C. She would not
recognize a gain on the distribution; instead her $50 built-in gain
would be preserved for future recognition on a sale of Blueacre.138 In
determining C’s basis in the distributed property, the partnership
would begin with her pre-distribution outside basis of $150, which it
would allocate between Blueacre and Inventory #1.139 As previously
134. The partnership holds two hot assets—Inventory #1 and Inventory #2—with a total fair
market value of $300 ($100 fair market value of Inventory #1 plus $200 fair market value of
Inventory #2). As a one-third partner in the partnership, each partner’s share of this aggregate fair
market value is $100 ($300 aggregate fair market value of hot assets * 1/3).
135. Similarly, C would have received exactly her share of cold assets. Before the
distribution, Blueacre was worth $300, and each partner shared this value equally, $100 each. C
then receives a portion of Blueacre with a fair market value of $100.
136. At the time of distribution, Inventory #2 had a fair market value of $200 and a basis of
$50.
137. As one-third partners, each partner’s share of this recognized gain would have been $50
($150 * 1/3).
138. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1) (2006).
139. Id. § 732(b), (c). In a complete liquidating distribution, the distributee partner’s basis in
the distributed property equals her pre-distribution outside basis less the amount of cash received
in the distribution. Id. § 732(b). If the partner’s outside basis is not sufficient to allow her to take
a basis in each item of distributed property equal to the partnership’s pre-distribution basis in the
property, then her post-distribution basis in the distributed property must be reduced. Section
732(c), which provides the rules governing the allocation of this basis reduction among the
distributed property, requires a partnership to first allocate basis to any distributed hot assets. Id.
§ 732(c)(1)(A)(i). Any outside basis remaining after this priority allocation is then allocated to the
distributed cold assets. Id. § 732(c)(1)(B).
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discussed, this basis allocation is achieved through a statutory basis
adjustment.140 Under these provisions, hot assets receive a priority
allocation of basis; hence, C would take a $100 basis in Inventory #1,
which equals the partnership’s basis in the property.141 C’s remaining
outside basis of $50 would then be allocated to Blueacre, which has a
$100 fair market value at the time of distribution.142 If C were to sell
Blueacre following the distribution, she would recognize a $50
capital gain, thereby effecting an improper character conversion.
Indeed, the distribution would have resulted in precisely the type of
character conversion that section 751(b) was designed to prevent.
Likewise, the distribution would produce inequitable results for
the remaining partners, A and B. After the distribution, the
partnership would have the following balance sheet:
Assets

Basis

Value

Inventory
Blueacre

50
200

200
200

Total

250

400

Capital

A
B

Basis

Value

150
150

200
200

300

400

The distribution would increase their respective shares of Inventory
#2’s built-in gain by $25, from $50 to $75. If the partnership were to
sell Inventory #2 after the distribution, it would recognize a gain of
$150 and allocate it equally between A and B, $75 each. In doing so,
the distribution would have improperly shifted $25 of Inventory #2’s
pre-distribution built-in gain to each of the remaining partners.143
140. Id. § 732(b); see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
141. Id. § 732(c)(1)(A)(i).
142. Id. § 732(c)(1)(B).
143. As previously discussed, this shift is only temporary; it will reverse itself when the
partners sell or liquidate their respective partnership interests. See Andrews, supra note 63.
Likewise, this is a situation that would trigger a basis adjustment under section 734(b) if the
partnership had made the proper election. I.R.C. §§ 734(b), 754. This elective basis adjustment
would allow the partnership to adjust its basis in the remainder of Blueacre to reflect the $50 of
basis “lost” in the distribution to C. Id. § 734(b)(1)(B). Section 734(b), even if elected by the
partnership, is an imperfect fix to this problem. Although it prevents the income shift, it fails to
address the character conversion. If the partnership were to make a basis adjustment, it would
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The culprit is section 751(b)’s triggering mechanism, which
relies on gross asset value to determine whether a distribution is
disproportionate. Value, as can be seen in the previous example, is
the wrong measure of disproportionality because it fails to capture
the distributions that section 751(b) was enacted to combat—
distributions that alter the amount or character of a partner’s share of
the partnership’s pre-distribution built-in gain. A triggering
mechanism proceeding from built-in gain, one that requires an
examination of the relationship between a property’s value and its
basis, would better align section 751(b) with its equitable goals.
Despite repeated efforts to reform section 751(b)’s triggering rule, it
remains grounded in gross asset value.144 And section 751(b) thus
remains counterproductive, allowing partnerships to alter the amount
and character of their partners’ shares of pre-distribution built-in gain
in violation of equitable norms.
Of equal importance, subchapter K’s distribution system also
compromises vertical equity.145 Modern partnerships are immensely
polarized, with sophisticated, well-advised partnerships pursuing tax
shelters at one extreme, and simple, commercially focused
partnerships at the other extreme. In large part, subchapter K’s
distribution system evolved in response to the small number of
partnerships engaged in abusive transactions. Yet its complicated
provisions apply to all partnerships, whether big, small,

increase the basis of Blueacre by $50, from $200 to $250. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.755-1(c)(1)(i). In
doing so, the basis adjustment would create a $50 built-in capital loss in Blueacre, which A and B
would share equally, $25 each. Thus, each remaining partner would have a net built-in gain of
$50—a $25 built-in capital loss attributable to Blueacre and a $75 built-in ordinary gain
attributable to Inventory #2. Even though their net built-in gains would remain unchanged, A and
B may still be worse off in this situation due the limitations on capital losses. I.R.C. § 1211(b).
144. See, e.g., MCKEE ET AL., supra note 10, ¶ 21.01[2]; Andrews, supra note 7, at 48–49;
Burke, supra note 11, at 685; Gergen, supra note 30, at 353–54. As discussed supra note 131, the
Treasury is considering an alternative method of determining whether a distribution is
disproportionate. I.R.S. Notice 2006-14, 2006-1 C.B. 498. More specifically, the Treasury has
requested comments on the “hypothetical sale approach” to the disproportionality determination.
Id. Under this approach, a partnership would compare the amount of ordinary income that would
be recognized by its partners if it sold all of its hot assets, including any hot asset distributed to its
partners, for their fair market value immediately before and immediately after the distribution at
issue. Id. A distribution would be disproportionate if any partner’s allocated share of ordinary
income decreased as a result of the distribution. Id. Additionally, the partnership would be
required to take into account section 704(c) principles, namely a revaluation of the partnership’s
property, in making this determination. Id. In doing so, it is hoped that a significantly smaller
number of distributions would trigger section 751(b).
145. See WITTE, supra note 15.
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sophisticated, or simple.146 Everyday partnerships, which share little
in common with sheltering partnerships, thus bear a disproportionate
burden, financial and otherwise, for the abusive behavior of a
minority of partnerships.
c. Instability
Throughout the past half-century, subchapter K’s distribution
system has become a technical minefield with few guides for
partnerships attempting to navigate its provisions. The system lacks
the unifying ties necessary to foster stability in partnership
distributions. The result is incoherence; partnerships often do not
know what the law of distributions is.
Consider the average partnership making a distribution to one of
its partners. This partnership might know, as a general matter, that a
distribution is a nonrecognition event; thus, the partnership may
expect that neither it nor the distributee partner will recognize gain
on the transaction. Imagine this partnership’s dismay at learning that
subchapter K’s general nonrecognition rule is subject to at least four
separate anti-abuse provisions, any of which might require gain
recognition.147 Further, each of these provisions operates differently,
requiring the partnership to work through four triggers and four
computational analyses in determining the tax consequences of this
one distribution.148 Perhaps more surprising, some of these antiabuse provisions may require gain recognition by the non-distributee
partners as well, who receive nothing in the distribution.149
146. See, e.g., Lawrence Lokken, As the World of Partnership Taxation Turns, 56 SMU L.
REV. 365, 367 (2003) (“The revolutionary accretion of detail in subchapter K is largely a
response to aggressive uses of partnerships for tax avoidance . . . The dilemma of subchapter K is
that rules considered essential to the effective application of the tax laws to some partnerships and
their partners apply to all partnerships, including those utterly lacking in capability to apply the
rules, which likely comprise a large majority of all partnerships.”); Yin, supra note 5, at 191
(“Although larger businesses would also benefit from simplification, they might have alternative
means not available to smaller businesses of coping with tax law complexity.”).
147. Even the Service recognizes this inconsistency between the commercial expectations of
many partners and the current state of subchapter K’s distribution system: “Although the general
rule aims to treat partnership distributions as nontaxable events, the exceptions can quickly
overshadow the general rule.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PARTNERSHIP–AUDIT TECHNIQUE
GUIDE CH. 4 (2007).
148. See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text.
149. I.R.C. §§ 707(a)(2)(B), 751(b) (2006). With respect to section 751(b), the Treasury is
considering an alternative to current law’s exchange method of determining the tax consequences
of a triggering distribution. I.R.S. Notice 2006-14, 2006-1 C.B. 498. Under the proposed “hot
asset sale approach,” a disproportionate distribution would be recast as a two-step transaction: (1)
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Subchapter K’s distribution system is indeed tangled, often
running contrary to partnerships’ expectations. Considered in this
light, it is no wonder that so many partnerships struggle to
understand and apply the law of partnership distributions.
3. The Compliance Crisis
The true cost of this dysfunctionality is reflected in declining
compliance across the partnership spectrum. Distributions are a
minefield for the average partnership, with traps for the unwary at
every turn. The complexity and cost of accessing this discordant
system have made full compliance virtually impossible for many, if
not most, partnerships. Consider, for instance, this description of
section 751(b):
[Section 751(b)’s] application is not recognized in [ninety]
percent of the cases to which it applies . . . In half the cases
in which its applicability is recognized, the other remaining
[ten] percent, it is ignored because the cost of complying is
far greater than any revenue gain, and in, I would say, half
of the remaining [five] percent, when people including the
Internal Revenue Service, attempt to apply it, they do so
incorrectly.150
Well-intentioned partnerships are thus left with few good options.
They can try to run subchapter K’s gauntlet, taking the risk of falling
a distribution of the partner’s share of the relinquished hot assets; and (2) a subsequent taxable
sale of the hot assets back to the partnership immediately before the actual distribution. Id. Unlike
current law, the partner relinquishing a share of the partnership’s cold assets would no longer
recognize gain on the disproportionate distribution. Numerous commentators have proposed
“tweaks” to this hot asset sale approach, all of which are designed to produce comparable results
with less complexity. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF TAXATION, supra note 131, at
24–25; N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, supra note 131, at 37–50; Karen C. Burke,
Remedying Flaws in the Hot Asset Sale Approach, 116 TAX NOTES 279 (2007).
150. Issues Relating to Passthrough Entities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select
Revenue Measures of the U.S. H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 99th Cong. 56 (1986) (statement of
Joel Rabinovitz). Mr. Rabinovitz is not alone in his assessment of section 751(b). See, e.g., AM.
LAW INST. SUBCHAPTER K PROJECT, supra note 11, at 51 (“If the reports of noncompliance with
Section 751(b) are correct, the continuance of such a provision must have an adverse bearing on
taxpayer respect for the law.”); Berger, supra note 11, at 147 (describing section 751(b) as one
“of subchapter K’s least understood and most widely ignored provisions”); Eustice, supra note
11, at 383 (“Section 751(b) is difficult to understand and complex in operation, and as a
consequence it is probably largely unenforced. It may be the Achilles heel of subchapter K.”);
Hanna, supra note 11, at 524 (“The almost unanimous consensus has been that section 751(b)
should never have been enacted or, at the very least, should have been repealed years ago.”);
Lokken, supra note 5, at 277 (describing subchapter K’s distribution system as “one of the
principle repositories of unworkable complexity” in partnership taxation).
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into one of its many distribution-related traps. Or, they can forego
technical compliance and instead follow what scholars call an
“intuitive subchapter K,” doing the best they can with available
resources and hoping to escape the attention of the Internal Revenue
Service (“Service”).151 In either case, the result is troublesome—
subchapter K’s distribution system appears to be honored largely in
the breach.152
In contrast, distributions continue to be a treasure trove for the
small number of partnerships pursuing tax shelters. Subchapter K’s
complicated anti-abuse provisions are often incomplete, leaving gaps
for tax shelters and offering roadmaps for future abusive
transactions. Further, sheltering partnerships benefit from the
noncompliance of nonsheltering partnerships, which shields their
abuse from detection by the Service. Indeed, these partnerships
capitalize on the struggles of the average partnership by using the
overall dysfunctionality of partnership distributions to their financial
advantage.
When compliance falters, the public cost is significant. Tax
revenues suffer, and partners question the fairness of the distribution
system and subchapter K, more generally. A vicious cycle emerges
where noncompliance, public illegitimacy, and discord reinforce one
another. The resulting instability breeds frustration among partners
who, in turn, are more inclined to perceive subchapter K as corrupt.

151. Lokken, supra note 146, at 367 (“[W]e already have a K lite, consisting of the present
subchapter K stripped of all the rules and nuances that tax practitioners serving ordinary
partnerships do not understand and simply ignore.”); Lokken, supra note 5, at 252 (“A large
number of partnerships thus seem to be governed by what might be called an ‘intuitive subchapter
K.’ Taxpayers and tax advisers who want to comply account for partnership transactions in ways
that are consistent with their conceptions of the basic aims of subchapter K.”); Yin, supra note 5,
at 201 (“[I]t may well be that many small firms . . . already utilize a watered-down, intuitive
version of subchapter K.”).
One might wonder why an intuitive subchapter K is problematic, especially if most
partnerships can approximate the right result without incurring the expense of navigating
subchapter K’s complexity. See Philip F. Postlewaite, I Come to Bury Subchapter K, Not to
Praise It, 54 TAX LAW. 451, 473 (2001). Ultimately, this is an empirical question, and the answer
depends on how “close” the results are under an intuitive subchapter K. Yet the empirical work
necessary to analyze this claim regarding partner compliance has not been done, and the
substantive work of reforming partnership taxation must proceed. Thus, we must proceed
provisionally using reasonable working assumptions about partnership compliance. To that end,
this Article assumes that non-sheltering partnerships want to follow the law and, thus, a system
where large numbers of partnerships are excluded from the possibility of “perfect” compliance is
problematic.
152. Lokken, supra note 146, at 365–66; Yin, supra note 5, at 235.
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These partners are thus more likely to engage in abusive
distributions, which often provoke counterproductive responses from
the government, further entrenching complexity, inequity, and
instability in partnership distributions.
E. The Problem of Nonrecognition
Partnership distributions are deeply flawed, with challenges
almost too numerous to count. Subchapter K’s complicated
distribution provisions, their relationship to one another, and their
impact on partnership taxation as a whole are entirely dysfunctional.
Calls for reforming or repealing subchapter K’s most troublesome
provisions, particularly section 751(b), thus began shortly after
codification in 1954 and continue to this day.153
Yet these calls misconstrue the problem posed by partnership
distributions. Section 751(b) is not the problem; nor are any of
subchapter K’s individual provisions, despite their many flaws.
153. See supra note 11. In 1999, the Clinton Administration proposed repealing section
751(b) as part of a larger, coordinated reform of partnership distributions. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S REVENUE PROPOSALS 134
(1999), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/GeneralExplanations-FY2000.pdf; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL
237 (Comm. Print 1999), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id
=1225. Despite this laudable effort at comprehensive distribution reform, the Clinton
Administration’s proposals were not well received by many members of the partnership tax
community. See, e.g., Ernst & Young LLP, Analysis of the Administration’s Partnership
Proposals, 84 TAX NOTES 103 (1999); Barton Massey, McKee Blasts Administration’s Tax
Shelter/Partnership Proposals, 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 48-8 (Mar. 12, 1999). But see Karen C.
Burke, Reassessing the Administration’s Proposals for Reform of Subchapter K, 86 TAX NOTES
1423 (2000). Recently, Representative Dave Camp, Chairman of the Committee on Ways and
Means, released a discussion draft targeted at pass-through tax reform. H. COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE DISCUSSION DRAFT
PROVISIONS TO REFORM THE TAXATION OF SMALL BUSINESS AND PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES
(2013), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/final_sm_bus_passthrough
_technical_explanation_03_12_13.pdf [hereinafter, COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 2013
PASSTHROUGH DISCUSSION DRAFT]; see also Karen C. Burke, Pass-Through Entities: The
Missing Element in Business Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1329 (2013); George K. Yin,
Comments on Selected Draft Reforms of the House Committee on Ways & Means on the Taxation
of Passthrough Entities, 140 TAX NOTES 358 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2275324; Williard B. Taylor, Should There Be One Set of
Passthrough Rules for All Non-Publicly Traded Businesses? (Option 2 of the Ways and Means
Committee Draft to Reform the Taxation of Small Business and Passthrough Entities)
(Oct. 22, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2343776. Representative Camp’s discussion draft offers two options for the
reform of subchapter K and S. Interestingly, both proposals retain section 751(b), expanding its
scope to treat all inventory, rather than just substantially appreciated inventory, as hot assets. Id.
at 30–31, 57.
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Nonrecognition—the central premise of subchapter K’s distribution
system—is the problem. Fixing partnership distributions thus
requires fixing nonrecognition, not the anti-abuse provisions
designed to combat particular transactions that exploit subchapter
K’s liberal distribution system. Indeed, a continued focus on these
anti-abuse provisions only exacerbates the problem with partnership
distributions, perpetuating the vicious cycle that is rooted in the
system’s core nonrecognition premise.
If recognition were instead the rule, partnerships would no
longer be able to defer built-in gains; hence, distributions would no
longer create opportunities for partnerships to convert character, shift
income, or avoid the recognition of gain. In turn, there would be no
need for so many intricate anti-abuse provisions to prevent improper
distributions. Partnership distributions would thus look very different
than they do today: simpler, more equitable, and more stable.
The time has come to rethink partnership distributions,
beginning with the nonrecognition premise at the system’s
foundation. An alternative vision of partnership distributions, one
without the imprint of nonrecognition, is needed.
III. RETHINKING PARTNERSHIP DISTRIBUTIONS
This Article takes first steps toward greater functionality and
harmony in partnership distributions, reimagining these transactions
from a recognition-based perspective. In describing the challenge of
designing a viable system of taxing distributions before subchapter
K’s codification, one scholar noted that:
It is a pleasant bit of mental gymnastics to criticize the
patchwork system that has developed, and to demand with
righteous indignation that the Treasury and the courts
cooperate in a coherent and consistent matter of taxation. It
is a grimmer job, however, to formulate a set of rules which
will be consistent in theory, equitable in effect, and simple
in practice. The dilemma is nicely illustrated by one
fundamental problem, that of distributions in kind to a
partner. The challenge is to draft a statute which will
extricate taxpayer and Government from their present
difficulties, by neatly correlating the answers in terms of
partnership gain, or loss, partnership basis, partners’ gains
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or losses, and partners’ bases. It should be possible—or so
one would think.154
These words are equally true today, sixty years later. Rethinking
distributions is a daunting task, but it is one that can no longer be
ignored.
In rethinking distributions, I draw inspiration from an unlikely
source—the disproportionate distribution rule of section 751(b).
Contrary to conventional wisdom, section 751(b) got the theory of
partnership distributions right, treating liquidating distributions as
taxable exchanges. When considered in this light, section 751(b)’s
principal flaw is not its complexity, or even its inability to prevent
abuse. Rather, it is the provision’s failure to treat all liquidating
distributions as recognition events. Expanding recognition may thus
hold the solution to the seemingly intractable problem of partnership
distributions.
This Article thus proposes dividing distributions into two
categories—operating distributions and liquidating distributions—in
order to rationalize their treatment. Operating distributions would
continue to be treated as preemptively tax-free transactions in which
the distribution itself has no impact on the relationship among the
partners. Liquidating distributions, however, would be treated as
taxable exchanges between the partnership and the distributee
partner.
I do not mean to suggest that a recognition-based approach to
distributions is perfect, or perfectly simple. It is neither. But a
recognition-based approach would align the tax treatment of
liquidating distributions with their commercial substance,
recognizing these transactions’ economically transformative effect
on partnerships and their partners. In so doing, this proposal would
offer a simpler, more equitable, and more stable system of taxing
distributions. A recognition rule would create a pathway to a more
coherent subchapter K, one that would be more accessible to the
many partnerships that are struggling, and often failing, to navigate
the current law.

154. Mark H. Johnson, Notes: Property Distributions by Partners, 4 TAX L. REV. 118, 118
(1948) (footnotes omitted).
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A. Recognition-Based Distributions
In reimagining partnership distributions, I propose two
foundational changes to subchapter K: redefining distributions and
reformulating their tax consequences. Simplification should be a
priority, with provisions that are accessible to partnerships at all
levels of wealth and sophistication. Likewise, a reformed distribution
system should prioritize equity. Partnership distributions should not
alter the amount or character of any partner’s share of the
partnership’s pre-distribution built-in gain. If the partnership cannot
preserve these amounts for future recognition by the appropriate
partner, then such partner should recognize gain at the time of
distribution. A greater focus on simplicity and equity, in turn, would
foster stability in the tax treatment of distributions, providing
partnerships with a coherent guide through subchapter K’s
distribution system.
1. Property Distributions
Reforming partnership distributions begins with economic
reality. A starting point in this project is thus the tax treatment of
property distributions. In these transactions, a partnership terminates
its investment in the distributed property, potentially altering the
amount and character of each partner’s share of the property’s builtin gain. Considered in this light, treating property distributions as
taxable transactions in all instances is appropriate; it would better
match the tax consequences of these distributions with their
commercial reality.155
Under this proposal, a partnership would recognize gain on the
distribution of appreciated property.156 The partnership would
155. This proposal would align the partnership-level treatment of property distributions with
the treatment of property distributions by C corporations and S corporations. I.R.C. §§ 311(b),
336(a), 1371(a) (as amended in 2006). Under these provisions, a corporation recognizes gain on
the distribution of appreciated property in all instances. Id. § 311(b). Losses, in contrast, are only
recognized when property is distributed in complete liquidation of the corporation. Id. § 336(a).
This approach also mirrors the current capital account treatment of property distributions, which
requires a partnership to recognize any economic gains and losses in the distributed property
before it is transferred to the distributee partner. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(e)(1) (2013).
156. Taxing property distributions at the partnership level, standing alone, would represent an
important step forward in rationalizing the tax treatment of partnership distributions. It thus could
be severed from the remainder of this Article’s proposal. Indeed, numerous scholars have
proposed taxing property distributions in this manner as part of larger reform projects. See, e.g.,
Berger, supra note 11, at 154; Eustice, supra note 11, at 383–84; Gergen, supra note 11, at 220–
23; Jeffrey L. Kwall, Taxing Private Enterprise in the New Millennium, 51 TAX LAW. 229, 258–
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compute the amount and character of this gain based on a
hypothetical sale of the distributed property at its fair market value
immediately before the distribution. The partnership would then
allocate the recognized gain among all its partners, including the
distributee partner, according to their pre-distribution sharing
arrangement.157 Each partner would increase her outside basis
accordingly to reflect her share of this recognized gain, and the basis
of the distributed property would be similarly increased.
To illustrate, let’s return to the ABC partnership. This time, let’s
assume that the partnership has three assets: cash, inventory, and a
new investment property (“Orangeacre”). Imagine that the
partnership distributes Orangeacre to C in partial liquidation of her
partnership interest. Immediately before the distribution, the
partnership has the following balance sheet:

61 (1998); Lokken, supra note 5, at 277; Postlewaite et al., supra note 11, at 604, 606–07; Yin,
supra note 5, at 229. In addition, the House Ways and Means Committee recently issued a
discussion draft of provisions designed to reform the taxation of pass-through entities. See
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 2013 PASSTHROUGH DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 153. Under
its uniform proposal for the taxation of pass-through entities, pass-through entities would
recognize gain, but not loss, on the distribution of property to their owners. Id. at 50–51.
157. As previously discussed, supra note 117, one might argue that taxing the distributee
partner on her share of the distributed property’s gain would be inappropriate. See Burke, supra
note 11, at 698. To the extent that the distributee partner is treated as directly owning her share of
the distributed property, the liquidating distribution would have little effect, simply transferring
property to the distributee partner that, under the aggregate theory of partnerships, she would
already be treated as owning. When considered in this light, the distributee partner would be
overtaxed if she were required to recognize gain attributable to this portion of the distributed
property. Id.
Consistent with the aggregate theory of partnerships, one could address this problem
through a hybrid recognition/nonrecognition approach. The distributee partner would not
recognize her share of the gain on the transfer of the distributed property. This share of built-in
gain would be deferred, instead recognized by the distributee partner in the future when she sells
the distributed property. In order to implement this approach, a basis adjustment provision would
be necessary, requiring the distributee partner to take a basis in the distributed property that
reflects the amount of pre-distribution built-in gain deferred on the distribution. Although perhaps
a more technically “pure” approach to partnership distributions, I have decided against this hybrid
approach because of the additional complexity that it would introduce into a reformed distribution
system.
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Assets

Basis

Value

Capital

Basis

Value

Cash
Inventory
Orangeacre

400
10
70

400
100
100

A
B
C

160
160
160

200
200
200

Total

480

600

480

600

At the partnership level, the distribution would be treated as a fully
taxable transaction, and the partnership would recognize
Orangeacre’s $30 built-in gain. If the partnership had sold
Orangeacre for its fair market value of $100 rather than distributing
the property to C, it would have recognized a $30 capital gain.158
Each partner would thus recognize a $10 capital gain in connection
with Orangeacre’s distribution and increase her outside basis
accordingly, from $160 to $170.159 The partnership, in turn, would
increase its basis in Orangeacre by $30, from $70 to $100.
At this point, the partnership would have the following balance
sheet:
Assets

Basis

Value

Capital

Basis

Value

Cash
Inventory
Orangeacre

400
10
100

400
100
100

A
B
C

170
170
170

200
200
200

Total

510

600

510

600

158. Orangeacre had a fair market value of $100 immediately before the distribution, and its
basis was $70. Thus, the partnership’s sale of the property would have resulted in a recognized
gain of $30. I.R.C. § 1001. Because the partnership held Orangeacre as investment property, this
$30 gain would have been a capital gain. Id. § 1221(a).
159. Id. §§ 704(b), 705(a)(1)(A).
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Each partner would thus be taxed on her share of Orangeacre’s builtin gain. Consistent with equitable norms, the distribution would not
alter the amount or character of any partner’s share of this gain.160
2. Redefining Partnership Distributions
At the partner-level, the tax treatment of partnership
distributions should reflect the commercial substance of these
common, but diverse, transactions. This proposal thus begins with
the premise that operating distributions and liquidating distributions
are fundamentally different transactions. Operating distributions are
largely invisible; they do not affect the partners’ relationship to the
partnership, its property, or its profits. Considered in this light, the
current law’s general nonrecognition rule is well suited to this type
of distribution.161 Liquidating distributions, in contrast, involve an
economic transformation of the partnership, with a partner
terminating her investment in the enterprise in whole or in part.
Accordingly, treating these distributions as taxable exchanges
between the partner and the partnership is more appropriate.
To implement this reformed distribution system, it is necessary
to define operating distributions and liquidating distributions. Under
this proposal, operating distributions would typically involve ratable
distributions. These distributions do not alter the partners’ respective
interests in the partnership; hence, they would remain largely tax-free
transactions.162 Liquidating distributions, in contrast, would include
all distributions where a partner terminates any portion of her
investment in the partnership. In doing so, all distributions, whether

160. The tax consequences of the distribution to C, the distributee partner, will be discussed
infra Part III.A.3.
161. This Article, however, does propose several changes to the general nonrecognition
treatment of partnership distributions, all narrowing the parameters of the current law’s
nonrecognition rule. The primary changes involve the partnership’s recognition of gain on any
distribution of property. See supra Part III.A.1. The remaining changes will be discussed infra
note 162 and accompanying text.
162. As a general matter, a partner would not recognize gain on the receipt of an operating
distribution. Rather, she would reduce her outside basis by the amount of cash received or the
basis she takes in any distributed property. There would, however, be one exception to this rule: if
the cash or the fair market value of any distributed property exceeds the distributee partner’s
outside basis, then she would recognize a gain equal to such excess. Similarly, this proposal
would require the partnership to make a corresponding adjustment to the basis of its remaining
property in order reflect the gain recognized by the distributee partner. In doing so, subchapter
K’s distribution system would ensure that each partner’s share of the partnership’s predistribution built-in gains are properly preserved.
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complete or partial, that affect the amount or character of a partner’s
share of the partnership’s pre-distribution built-in gain would be
treated as liquidating distributions and subject to the recognitionbased treatment proposed herein.163
At the extremes, distinguishing operating distributions and
liquidating distributions is relatively straight forward: ratable
distributions are operating distributions and distributions in complete
liquidation of a partner’s partnership interest are liquidating
distributions. But identifying partial liquidating distributions presents
a greater challenge, one requiring additional guidance as to the
proper treatment of non-ratable distributions. As previously
discussed, economic reality is the driver of this recognition-based
approach to distributions. To that end, this proposal would treat a
non-ratable distribution as a liquidating distribution if it alters the
amount or character of a partner’s share of pre-distribution
partnership built-in gain, as reflected in the partners’ sharing
arrangement.164 Accordingly, changes in the partners’ method of
sharing partnership profits, particularly gains derived from the
disposition of its property, would be central to defining partial
liquidating distributions.165
163. See infra Part III.A.3.
164. This is currently the trigger for a revaluation of the partnership’s property. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(5)(ii) (2013). Under this provision, a partnership may elect to revalue its
asset in connection with a distribution of money or property “by the partnership to a retiring or
continuing partner as consideration for an interest in the partnership.” Id.
165. In proposing a recognition-based approach to liquidating distributions, one scholar
would require the partners to enter into various agreements designed to memorialize the change in
each partner’s interest in the partnership. Postlewaite et al., supra note 11, at 598–99. Under this
proposal, the partners would be required to execute the following agreements within thirty days
of any liquidating distribution: (1) an allocation agreement, specifying the fair market value of all
of the partnership’s property; and (2) a sales agreement, specifying the partnership interest to be
sold and its selling price. Id. at 599. Other scholars have proposed alternative means of
identifying and quantifying partial liquidating distributions. One method focuses on the
proportionate reduction in a partner’s partnership interest. See AM. LAW INST., MEMORANDUM
NO. 3, supra note 11, at 37–40. This proportionate reduction method relies on a mathematical
formula to distinguish ratable distributions from non-ratable partial liquidating distributions. See
AM. LAW INST., MEMORANDUM NO. 3, supra note 11, at 40 (adopting the formula (1 − b/a) / (1 −
b), where “a” equals the distributee partner’s pre-distribution interest in the entity and “b” equals
her post-distribution interest in the entity). Another method focuses on the relative value of the
distribution. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, REVIEW OF SELECTED ENTITY
CLASSIFICATION AND PARTNERSHIP TAX ISSUES 35–36 (Comm. Print 1997), available at
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=2071 (comparing the fair market
value of property distributed to the pre-distribution fair market value of the distributee partner’s
partnership interest). In many instances, all of these methods arrive at the same result. See infra
note 170 and accompanying text for an example of a distribution that would be treated as a partial
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To illustrate how these definitions work, consider again the ABC
partnership. Let’s assume that the partnership is considering making
a variety of distributions. Before it engages in any of these
transactions, it has the following balance sheet:
Assets

Basis

Value

Capital

Basis

Value

Cash
Inventory
Orangeacre

400
10
70

400
100
100

A
B
C

160
160
160

200
200
200

Total

480

600

480

600

Imagine that the partnership distributes $50 of cash to all three
partners. This transaction would qualify as an operating distribution.
Each partner would receive her respective share of the partnership’s
previously taxed income; the distribution has no other effect. Before
and after the transaction, each partner holds an equal one-third
interest in the partnership. Likewise, the amount and character of
each partner’s pre-distribution share of the partnership’s built-in
gains would be preserved. Indeed, the partnership would have the
following balance sheet after the distribution:
Assets

Basis

Value

Capital

Basis

Value

Cash
Inventory
Orangeacre

250
10
70

250
100
100

A
B
C

110
110
110

150
150
150

Total

330

450

330

450

liquidating distribution under all of these methods. Nonetheless, further study is required to
determine whether one method would be superior to the others, or whether a standards-based
approach that would allow partnerships to account for all relevant facts and circumstances would
be preferable.
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The tax treatment of the ABC partnership’s distribution would
remain largely unchanged under this proposal.166 Neither the
partnership nor the partners would recognize a gain on the
distribution.167 Each partner would instead reduce her outside basis
to reflect the amount of cash distributed, from $160 to $110.168
The tax consequences would be the same if the partnership had
made a series of cash distributions that, when taken together, were
proportionate. More generally, if a partnership makes a series of
individual distributions during the taxable year that, when
aggregated, are proportionate, then the series of distributions would
be treated as a single operating distribution.169 For instance, imagine
that the ABC partnership had staggered its $50 cash distributions,
with A receiving her distribution in April, B in June, and C in
November. Considered individually, these distributions may not
qualify as operating distributions. But, together, they would be
treated as a single operating distribution, effecting no change in the
partners’ interests in the partnership.
Alternatively, let’s now assume that the ABC partnership does
not distribute cash to its partners. Instead, it distributes Orangeacre to
C in partial liquidation of her partnership interest. C relinquishes
one-half of her partnership interest in the distribution, thus
decreasing her interest in the enterprise from one-third to one-fifth
and increasing A’s and B’s respective interests from one-third to twofifths. This distribution would be treated as a liquidating distribution
where C terminates a portion of her investment in the partnership.170
Under this proposal, the tax consequences of this transaction—a

166. For a discussion of the proposed changes to the tax treatment of operating distributions,
see supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
167. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1), (b) (2006).
168. Id. § 732(a)(1).
169. This aggregation rule would also apply to property distributions. In both instances, only
the excess portion of any distribution would be treated as a liquidating distribution.
170. This distribution would be treated as a partial liquidating distribution under all of the
method discussed supra note 165. Under the proportionate reduction method, C’s partnership
interest would be reduced by one-half ((1−.2⁄.33) ⁄ (1−.2) = .5, where .33 equals C’s predistribution partnership interest and .2 equals C’s post-distribution partnership interest). Likewise,
using the value-based method, C’s distribution would reduce her interest in the partnership.
Before the distribution, the fair market value of her partnership interest was $200 (1/3 of the $600
fair market value of the partnership). When she receives a distribution of Orangeacre, with a fair
market value of $100, the distribution would represent one-half of the overall fair market value of
her partnership interest.

TAXING REALITY

716

10/7/2014 6:48 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:657

transaction in which C’s investment is terminated—would follow a
recognition-based approach.
3. Taxing Liquidating Distributions
A recognition-based approach is grounded in the principle that
liquidating distributions are, in substance, taxable exchanges
between partners and partnerships. A partnership transfers cash or
property to a partner, and the partner relinquishes all or a portion of
her interest in the partnership in exchange. When viewed in this
light, liquidating distributions are straightforward property
dispositions, giving rise to recognized gain at the partner level.
The tax treatment of the distributee partner would follow a
recognition rule, with the liquidating distribution triggering the
recognition of any built-in gain reflected in her partnership interest.
In order to determine the amount and character of such gain, this
proposal adopts the full fragmentation method.171 Under full
fragmentation, the partnership entity would be disregarded, and the
distributee partner would be treated as disposing of her interest in
each individual item of partnership property in a fully taxable
transaction.172 This method is thus grounded in the aggregate theory
of partnerships, where each partner is considered a direct co-owner
of a portion of each item of partnership property.173 Put another way,
171. See Postlewaite et al., supra note 11, at 604–06. Other scholars have proposed taxing
partnership distributions, but these proposals rely on alternative methods of determining the tax
consequences to the distributee partner. See Berger, supra note 11, at 109 (proposing that
Congress follow the corporate approach and adopt provisions treating disproportionate
distributions like stock redemptions); Gergen, supra note 11, at 213–20 (proposing an accountsbased approach to partnership distributions, where a partner would recognize gain on a
distribution in excess of her share of the partnership’s accumulated earnings or debt).
172. This approach is similar to subchapter K’s current treatment of sales of partnership
interests, which follows a partial fragmentation approach. I.R.C. §§ 741, 751(a). As a general
matter, sales of partnership interests follow the entity theory of partnerships. The sale of a
partnership interest is treated like a sale of stock in a corporation; the selling partner is treated as
if she sold an interest in the partnership entity itself, and any gain recognized on the sale is treated
as a capital gain. Id. § 741. Consistent with its historic concerns about character conversions,
however, Congress subjected these sales to a “look-through” rule, which uses partial
fragmentation to prevent the conversion of ordinary income into capital gains. Id. § 751(a). In
general terms, the partial fragmentation method requires a partnership to first identify its hot
assets. Id. § 751(c), (d). To the extent that any portion of the purchase price is attributable to the
sale of the partner’s share of these hot assets, the selling partner’s recognized gain is treated as
ordinary income rather than capital gain. Id. § 751(a). For a more detailed discussion of sales of
partnership interests and the use of the partial fragmentation method, see generally MCKEE ET
AL., supra note 10, ¶ 17; WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 54, ¶ 12.02.
173. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
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full fragmentation looks through the partnership and assesses the
consequences of a liquidating distribution on a property-by-property
basis. In doing so, full fragmentation would best implement
subchapter K’s equitable priorities—it would preserve the amount
and character of each partner’s share of the partnership’s predistribution built-in gains.174
Operationally, full fragmentation would follow the same basic
approach as was applied to the partnership’s distribution of
property.175 It would treat the partnership as if it had entered into a
hypothetical sale of all its property immediately before the
distribution. To the extent that the partnership would have allocated
any hypothetical gains to the distributee partner, the full
fragmentation method would require her to recognize these gains as
part of the liquidating distribution. Likewise, the character of these
recognized gains would be determined based on the hypothetical
sale. Because this is a fully taxable transaction, the distributee
partner would take a basis in any distributed property equal to its fair
market value.
As a final step in the exchange, the partnership would adjust the
basis of its remaining property to reflect any gains recognized by the
distributee partner. This would be necessary to ensure that the postdistribution built-in gain in the partnership’s property, as reflected in
the difference between value and basis, only includes the remaining
partners’ share of the partnership’s pre-distribution built-in gain.176
Put another way, increasing the partnership’s basis by the amount of
gain recognized by the distributee partner would ensure that the
remaining partners are not subsequently taxed on the distributee
partner’s share of any pre-distribution built-in gain. This basis
adjustment would thus serve a critical role in a recognition-based
approach, preserving the amount and character of the non-distributee
partners’ respective shares of pre-distribution built-in gain.
There is, however, one practical wrinkle in applying the full
fragmentation method to liquidating distributions, relating to the
174. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
175. See supra Part III.A.1.
176. For capital account purposes, the treatment of the distributee partner should mirror the
tax treatment. To the extent that distributee partner recognizes any economic gain on the
exchange, the book value of the partnership’s remaining property should be increased
accordingly. In doing so, partnership rebookings would no longer be necessary in order to address
the changes resulting from a liquidating distribution.
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treatment of partial liquidating distributions. To that end, let’s return
to the ABC partnership’s distribution of Orangeacre to C in partial
liquidation of her partnership interest, which provides a useful
illustration. Because the distribution of Orangeacre would not
completely liquidate C’s partnership interest, she would remain a
partner in the partnership following the transaction. It is thus
necessary to split C’s partnership interest into two separate interests
when applying the full fragmentation method; C would redeem one
partnership interest in the partial liquidating distribution, and she
would retain the other partnership interest.
As previously discussed, C relinquished one-half of her
partnership interest in this distribution, reducing her interest from
one-third to one-fifth.177 The partnership would thus divide C’s
interest accordingly, using the percentage change in her partnership
interest to determine the value and basis of the liquidated and
retained interests. As a result, C would be deemed to liquidate onehalf of her partnership interest in the partial liquidating distribution.
The full fragmentation method would treat C as if she held two
partnership interests, each with a fair market value of $100 and a
basis of $85.178 And one of these interests would be redeemed in the
liquidating distribution.
Applying the full fragmentation method, C would be treated as
if she received Orangeacre and, in exchange, relinquished a portion
of her interest in the partnership’s remaining property—the cash and
Inventory—in a fully taxable transaction. C would recognize a $15
ordinary gain on this exchange. The gain would be determined based
on the partnership’s hypothetical sale of the Inventory for its fair
market value of $100 immediately before the distribution. The
partnership would recognize a $90 ordinary gain on this fictional
177. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
178. Immediately before the liquidating distribution, C held a single partnership interest with
a fair market value of $200 and a basis of $170 ($160 original basis plus $10 share of gain
recognized in connection with Orangeacre’s distribution). This outside basis of $170 takes into
account the partnership’s recognition of gain on Orangeacre’s distribution, which is discussed
supra Part III.A.1. There is thus a $30 built-in gain in this single pre-distribution partnership
interest, and such built-in gain is attributable to the Inventory. When the partnership interest is
divided into two equal partnership interests—one to be liquidated and one to be retained—each
partnership interest has a fair market value of $100 ($200 fair market value of single interest * ½)
and an outside basis of $85 ($170 basis of single interest * ½). Accordingly, each of these
partnership interests has a built-in gain of $15 ($100 fair market value of divided interest less $85
outside basis).
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sale, and it would allocate the gain equally among the partners, $30
each.179 C’s $30 share of this gain would then be divided between
her two partnership interests based on their relative values. In this
instance, the liquidated partnership interest and the retained
partnership interest are of equal value; thus, a $15 ordinary gain
would be allocated to C’s liquidated partnership interest. The
partnership, in turn, would increase its basis in the Inventory by $15,
from $10 to $25, to reflect C’s recognized gain. Likewise, C would
take a basis of $100 in Orangeacre, reflecting its fair market value at
the time of the exchange.180
After the liquidating distribution, the partnership would have the
following balance sheet:
Assets

Basis

Value

Capital

Basis

Value

Cash
Inventory

400
25

400
100

A
B
C

170
170
85

200
200
100

Total

425

500

425

500

C would now have a one-fifth interest in the partnership, and A’s and
B’s respective interests would increase to two-fifths.181 Going
forward, the partnership would allocate all taxable items—including
items attributable to the Inventory—using this post-distribution
sharing ratio. Put another way, the ABC partnership would
essentially become a new partnership, operating on a clean slate
without any need to look back to its pre-distribution history.
179. The Inventory would be sold for $100, when its basis was $10; hence, the partnership
would recognize a $90 ordinary gain on the hypothetical sale. I.R.C. § 1001 (2006).
180. This exchange would have no effect on C’s retained partnership interest. Her outside
basis in the retained interest would thus remain $85.
181. Immediately after the liquidating distribution to C, the partnership would hold assets
with an aggregate fair market value of $500. C would hold a partnership interest with a fair
market value of $100; hence, she holds a one-fifth interest in the partnership. A and B, in contrast,
would each hold partnership interests worth $200. Accordingly, their respective partnership
interests reflect a two-fifths interest in the partnership.
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Of equal importance, the full fragmentation method would
preserve the amount and character of each partner’s share of the
Inventory’s pre-distribution built-in gain. Before the distribution,
there was $90 of built-in gain in the Inventory, and each partner’s
share of this gain was $30. The partial liquidating distribution to C
would not alter these shares; each partner would either recognize her
respective share, or such share would be preserved for future
recognition on the partnership’s sale of the Inventory.
Consider A and B, the non-distributee partners. If the partnership
were to sell the Inventory following the distribution, it would
recognize a $75 ordinary gain, reflecting the difference between the
property’s fair market value of $100 and its basis of $25. The
partnership would allocate this gain among the partners based on
their post-distribution sharing arrangement. A and B would thus each
be allocated two-fifths, or $30, of this ordinary gain, consistent with
their pre-distribution shares of the Inventory’s built-in gain. The
same would be true for C. She would be allocated one-fifth, or $15,
of ordinary gain on the partnership’s sale of the Inventory. When
combined with the $15 of ordinary gain that she recognized on the
distribution, the full fragmentation method would properly account
for C’s $30 share of the Inventory’s pre-distribution built-in gain.
B. A New Day for Partnership Distributions
A recognition-based approach to liquidating distributions would
be transformative, modernizing and rationalizing subchapter K’s
treatment of these ubiquitous transactions. By recasting liquidating
distributions as taxable exchanges between partnerships and their
partners, this approach would align the tax treatment of liquidating
distributions with their commercial reality.
A recognition-based approach would focus attention on the
defining aspect of liquidating distributions—the severing of
investment ties between partners and property. Liquidating
distributions mark the end of an investment relationship, thus
signaling that tax deferral is no longer appropriate.182 Considered in
182. In arguing for a recognition-based approach to partnership distributions, one scholar
described a distributee partner’s decision to retain distributed property as a new investment
decision, one warranting current taxation. Postlewaite et al., supra note 11, at 597–98. To
Professor Postlewaite, a distributee partner has several options on receipt of a liquidating
distribution: she can sell the distributed property for its fair market value; she can borrow against
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this light, a recognition rule simply implements the foundational
principle that a transaction’s tax consequences should match its
corresponding economic consequences.
Nonetheless, a recognition-based approach to distributions may
initially seem like a radical realignment of subchapter K’s
distribution system. Yet the shift is largely expressive, reflecting the
evolving role of recognition in partnership distributions. As
previously discussed, nonrecognition in partnership distributions has
never been absolute, and Congress has increasingly turned to
recognition-based anti-abuse provisions in its efforts to combat
abusive distributions.183 The fight against tax shelters has already
eroded Congress’s commitment to nonrecognition in partnership
distributions. Accordingly, a recognition-based approach is best
viewed as the culmination of decades of governmental activity, not
as a revolutionary break with the past.184
This approach, however, would mark a new day for partnership
distributions. A recognition-based approach would bypass most, if
not all, of the traditional challenges of partnership distributions. In
doing so, it would raise promising possibilities, offering the hope of
a simpler, more equitable, and more stable system of partnership
distributions.

such property; or, if she had preferred, the distributee partner could have requested that the
partnership make her a distribution in cash, rather than property. Id. at 597. These options serve to
highlight the partner’s changing investment and, in turn, the propriety of a recognition-based
approach. Indeed, Professor Postlewaite would treat the distributee partner as if she “had sold [her
partnership] interest for cash and had subsequently purchased the assets, or had received cash and
had thereafter purchased them.” Id. at 598.
183. See supra Part II.C.2.
184. A recognition-based approach is also consistent with the larger trend toward entity
treatment in the taxation of business enterprises. The 1986 repeal of the General Utilities doctrine
had a profound impact on the treatment of corporate distributions and the taxation of business
entities, more broadly. Tax Reform Act of 1986, PUB. L. NO. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085, 2272
(codified at I.R.C. § 311(b)). Although a detailed discussion of the treatment of distributions
under subchapters C and S is beyond this Article’s scope, the provisions governing corporate
distributions are grounded in a recognition premise. See generally BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S.
EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶¶ 8.21, 9, 10
(7th ed. 2000); JAMES S. EUSTICE & JOEL D. KUNTZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF S
CORPORATIONS ¶¶ 8, 13 (4th ed. 2001). There is no reason why this trend toward recognition
should not extend into subchapter K. See supra note 156; see, e.g., Lokken, Future Without
Subchapter K, supra note 5, at 270 (“This [recognition] principle applies to S Corporations, as
well as C Corporations, establishing a history of gain recognition on distributions by pass-through
entities.”).
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Simplification would be the most immediate benefit of this
approach to partnership distributions.185 These reforms would
streamline the number and complexity of subchapter K’s distribution
provisions. Because a recognition rule would prevent partnerships
from using distributions as vehicles for tax sheltering, subchapter K
would no longer require an arsenal of anti-abuse provisions.186 Nor
would it require the secondary provisions that currently support these
anti-abuse provisions.187 Congress could thus dismantle large swaths
of subchapter K’s complicated distribution system.
A recognition-based approach would also strip away much of
subchapter K’s operational technicality. As previously discussed, the
distribution system’s complexity is driven, in part, by rule design,
with Congress trying to reconcile flexibility and equity through
intricate and targeted provisions.188 By sacrificing nonrecognition,
and therefore flexibility, Congress would be able to recalibrate the
design of these provisions, clearing a path toward a more accessible
distribution system. Indeed, a recognition-based approach would
track a widely understood model—the general tax treatment of
property dispositions.189 In doing so, partnerships would face a
simpler, more rational distribution system.
Alongside simplification, a recognition-based approach would
better serve subchapter K’s equitable goals, preventing partnerships
from using distributions as vehicles for character conversions,
income shifting, and income avoidance. It would achieve this result
by ensuring that a distribution does not affect the amount or
character of any partner’s share of the partnership’s pre-distribution
built-in gains. These amounts would either be recognized at the time
of distribution or preserved for future recognition by the appropriate
partner on a future sale of the partnership’s property.
185. See AM. LAW INST., MEMORANDUM NO. 3, supra note 11, at 78 (“Administratively,
[recognition] would be the simplest option—no inside basis adjustments on a distribution, no
allocation problems . . . no need for Section 751(b)”); Burke, supra note 7, at 699 (noting that a
recognition-based approach “is simpler than existing section 751(b). It would ensure that the
partners’ post-distribution tax capital accounts and shares of [built-in gain] generally correspond
to their continuing percentage interests, thereby simplifying partnership accounting.”).
186. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B), 707(a)(2)(B), 731(a)(2), 734(b), 735, 737, 751(b)
(2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(5)(ii).
187. See, e.g., supra note 126.
188. See supra Part II.C.1.
189. Additionally, taxing partnership distributions of property would track the entity-level
treatment of corporate distributions since the 1986 repeal of General Utilities. See supra note 155.
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Likewise, these reforms would promote vertical equity norms. A
recognition-based approach would ameliorate the burden borne by
the many well-intentioned partnerships currently forced to navigate a
discordant system designed for the small number of partnerships
pursuing tax shelters. It would thus allow these everyday
partnerships to focus on their primary objective—the commercial
needs of their enterprise—instead of subchapter K’s distribution
system.
A recognition-based approach would also introduce muchneeded stability into partnership distributions. Despite the prevalence
of these distributions, their tax treatment remains surprisingly
uncertain. A recognition-based approach would change this, creating
a coherent system of taxation grounded in the premise that
liquidating distributions are taxable property dispositions. Everything
in this reconstituted system, from organizing principles to individual
provisions, would derive from this one premise. A harmonious
foundation, in turn, would allow partnerships to “see” how
distributions work, hence improving their ability to apply the law and
adapt it to novel distributions as they arise.
All together, a recognition-based approach would foster
simplicity, equity, and stability in partnership distributions. Yet, the
benefits of a reformed distribution system would extend beyond
subchapter K. Most immediately, compliance would improve across
the partnership spectrum. At one extreme, well-intentioned
partnerships would be able to understand and apply these reformed
provisions without the expenditure of excessive resources. At the
other extreme, sheltering partnerships would find a recognition-based
approach more costly and more difficult to manipulate. Indeed, it
would deny these partnerships the two items that have proven
instrumental in their pursuit of tax shelters: subchapter K’s current
technical, yet porous, provisions, and the shield created by the
noncompliance of everyday partnerships.
Improved compliance, in turn, would increase government
revenues and nurture a sense of public legitimacy in subchapter K. A
new cycle would emerge in partnership distributions: a recognitionbased approach would promote simplicity, equity, and stability in
distributions; improved functionality would foster compliance and
public legitimacy; and a growing sense of fairness would further
reinforce the system’s first principles of simplicity, equity, and
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stability. Eliminating nonrecognition would thus clear the path to a
better and more harmonious system of partnership distributions.
C. Some Objections
Any proposal for reforming partnership distributions is likely to
give rise to debate and criticism, and a recognition-based approach is
no exception. This subpart addresses several possible objections to
this proposal, concluding that none offers a compelling argument
against subchapter K’s reform. On the contrary, these potential
objections provide a final opportunity to consider the desirability of a
recognition-based approach to partnership distributions.
1. Recognition as Market Chilling
A critic might object to this proposal’s rejection of
nonrecognition, which is often considered a cornerstone of
partnership taxation. To this critic, nonrecognition promotes the
flexibility and informality that have historically defined subchapter
K; thus, the shift to a recognition-based approach would
fundamentally alter the nature of partnership distributions.190 In
doing so, a recognition rule might jeopardize the popularity of
subchapter K and chill the market for partnership transactions.191
This potential objection is overstated. As previously discussed,
recognition is not unknown in partnership distributions; subchapter K
has always included recognition-based anti-abuse provisions.192
Throughout subchapter K’s history, Congress has increasingly turned
to recognition rules to combat abusive distributions. Today, “many
partnership distributions are not nonrecognition events.”193

190. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., MEMORANDUM NO. 3, supra note 11, at 78; Burke, supra note
11, at 680; Ernst & Young LLP, supra note 153; Rebecca S. Rudnick, Enforcing the
Fundamental Premises of Partnership Taxation, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 229, 359 (1993).
191. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 11, at 680; Ernst & Young LLP, supra note 153; Jackson et
al., 1954 American Law Institute Draft, supra note 64, at 154.
192. See supra Part II.C.2.
193. See Yin, supra note 5, at 226. In addition, there are likely large numbers of distributions
that should be treated as recognition events under current law, but are erroneously treated as
nonrecognition transactions by partnerships. In many of these instances, the culprit may be
subchapter K’s distribution system itself, with its complicated arsenal of anti-abuse provisions.
Considered in this light, the increased number of partnership distributions that would be taxed
under a recognition-based approach may be misleading. A portion of this “increase” would stem
from improved compliance, rather than a foundational change in the law.
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Even so, a recognition-based approach to distributions would
accelerate the recognition of gain by some partners. Yet this would
be appropriate. Nonrecognition is not justified in transactions where
a partner’s or a partnership’s investment in property is terminated.194
Notwithstanding the cost of any accelerated gain recognition,
there is little reason to believe that a recognition-based approach to
distributions would chill the market for commercial partnership
transactions.195 As previously discussed, liquidating distributions are
often driven by personal considerations or commercial
imperatives.196 Although tax planning may play an important role in
structuring these transactions, it is a secondary role. Likewise, the
administrative cost savings of a streamlined distribution system
should offset some portion of the additional tax costs. This
proposal’s administrative savings would thus further diminish the
potential deterrent effect of a recognition rule.
2. Recognition as Counterproductive
A critic might also argue that the shift to a recognition-based
approach would be counterproductive from a complexity perspective,
194. See supra Part II.D.1. Much of the scholarly debate regarding nonrecognition in
subchapter K has taken place in the context of partnership contributions, rather than partnership
distributions. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 112, at 522–29; Laura E. Cunningham & Noël B.
Cunningham, Simplifying Subchapter K: The Deferred Sales Method, 51 SMU L. REV. 1 (1997);
Keyser, supra note 112; Andrea R. Monroe, Saving Subchapter K: Substance, Shattered Ceilings,
and the Problem of Contributed Property, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (2009); John P. Steines,
Partnership Allocations of Built-In Gain or Loss, 45 TAX LAW REV. 615, 653–55 (1990).
Whatever one’s view of the merits of nonrecognition in partnership contributions, it is important
to consider partnership distributions separately. Indeed, the policy rationales supporting
nonrecognition appear far less strong in the partnership distribution context. See Berger, supra
note 11, at 154–55 (“[A]fter the business is under way, there is little purpose in continued
nonrecognition when the venture disposes of business assets by returning them to the investors.
And, if the distribution is pursuant to a liquidation, the case of nonrecognition virtually disappears
as the conversion of an ongoing business from a partnership to a sole proprietorship rarely
occurs.”); Burke, supra note 112, at 534 (“Deferral of gain or loss inherent in the distributee’s
share of partnership assets should not be permitted for a non-pro rata distribution, since the
distributee has effectively terminated his interest in a portion of the partnership’s underlying
assets and should be taxed accordingly.”); Lokken, supra note 5, at 270 (“Requiring recognition
on distribution is probably less disruptive of legitimate business operations than would be
recognition on contribution.”); Postlewaite et al., supra note 11, at 597–98; Yin, supra note 5, at
226.
195. A recognition-based approach may adversely affect the popularity of subchapter K with
sheltering partnerships. That, however, should be considered a strength, not a weakness, of this
proposal.
196. See Burke, supra note 11, at 727; Yin, supra note 5, at 226; see also supra notes 31–32
and accompanying text.
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simply replacing one challenging system of taxing distributions with
another. This critic might note that a recognition rule relies on
mechanics—line drawing between distributions and full
fragmentation—that have been considered and rejected in the past, in
part, because of their complexity.197 Accordingly, this approach
might prove too complicated for modern partnerships, undermining
its simplification goals.
In truth, complexity objections seem more nostalgic than
substantive. No distribution system can eliminate complexity
entirely; partnership distributions, particularly liquidating
distributions, are too challenging. Yet a recognition-based approach
is distinctive in its potential to streamline subchapter K. By
eliminating nonrecognition in partnership distributions, this proposal
addresses the problem instead of its symptoms, clearing a path to a
simpler, more stable distribution system.
Nonetheless, this objection overstates the potential complexity
of a recognition-based approach. In both theory and practice, this
recognition-based approach focuses on commercial reality,
proposing reforms that would conform the tax treatment of
distributions to their economic substance.198 Redefining distributions,
for example, would reflect the fundamental commercial differences
between operating distributions and liquidating distributions.199 In
197. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 11, at 680; Jackson et al., Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
supra note 64, at 1211.
198. A related objection to a recognition-based approach to distributions focuses on the
administrative costs of a recognition rule, in particular the costs associated with valuing
partnership interests and partnership property. However, it is likely that many partnerships
already value their property in connection with distributions. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 11, at
210–11 (“[T]axing gains on asset distributions and redemptions of interests by partners imposes
some new administrative duties, but the additional administrative burden should be small since
most of the relevant information (for example, the value of a partner’s capital account, the value
of the distributed asset, and the value of other assets) already must be produced.”); Postlewaite et
al., supra note 11, at 598–99. If, for example, a partnership elects to rebook its property as part of
a liquidating distribution, the rules governing the rebooking process require the partnership to
revalue its property. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(1). Likewise, as a commercial matter, a
partnership may be required to value all of its property in order to determine the fair market value
of a retiring partner’s partnership interest. See Postlewaite et al., supra note 11, at 598–99.
199. Line drawing in partnership distributions focuses attention on the question of the proper
tax treatment of partially liquidating distributions. This question has proven quite controversial
among partnership tax scholars. Compare Andrews, supra note 7, at 43 (recommending a
“bifurcation” approach to partial liquidating distributions, where the distributee partner is treated
as holding two partnership interests—a liquidated partnership interest and a retained partnership
interest), Karen C. Burke, Taxing Hot Asset Shifts, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 327, 355 (2007), Burke,
supra note 153, at 171, and Postlewaite et al., supra note 11, at 598, with AM. LAW INST.,
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doing so, it would free Congress to design a comprehensive
distribution system that taxes liquidating distributions as what they
are—taxable property dispositions. A streamlined distribution
system, in turn, would better resonate with partnerships, allowing
them to more easily navigate partnership distributions and their
inevitable challenges.
Likewise, taxing distributions is not a novel concept.
Partnerships have considerable experience with recognition rules in
the distribution context.200 Partnerships also have experience with
fragmentation; the rules governing the tax treatment of sales of
partnership interests rely on a partial fragmentation method.201 More
generally, however, recognition is the baseline for property
transactions throughout the federal income tax. Partnerships may
thus rely on their most basic knowledge of general tax principles in
navigating a reformed recognition-based distribution system.
3. Recognition as Futile
A third potential objection to a recognition-based approach
focuses on the futility of reforming partnership distributions. This
critic would assert that a recognition rule would not prevent tax
abuse. If distributions no longer provided tax-advantaged results,
then wealthy and well-advised partnerships would simply find
alternative means of deferring tax.202
This objection proves too much, calling into question any
recognition-based effort to combat abusive distributions, including

MEMORANDUM NO. 3, supra note 11, at 55–58, Jackson et al., Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
supra note 64, at 145–46 (explaining that special rules for partial liquidating distributions are
difficult and rarely needed), Massey, supra note 153 (describing a speech given by William
McKee in which a partial liquidation rule was described as a “stealth bomber proposal” that
“radically changed the theory of subchapter K”), and Yin, supra note 5, at 229.
200. See supra Part II.C.2.
201. I.R.C. §§ 741, 751(a) (2006). For a more detailed discussion of the partial fragmentation
approach that applies to sales of partnership interests, see supra note 172. Additionally, section
1411 adopts a fragmentation approach when determining a taxpayers’ net investment income
subject to tax. I.R.C. § 1411(c)(4). For purposes of this provision, net investment income includes
any net gain attributable to the disposition of an active interest in a partnership. Id.
§ 1411(c)(1)(A)(iii). In order to compute this amount, the partnership is deemed to sell all of its
assets for their fair market value immediately before the disposition of the taxpayer’s partnership
interest. Id. § 1411(c)(4)(A). Any gains allocated to the partner on this hypothetical sale must be
included in the computation of her net investment income. Id.
202. See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT—TAXATION OF PASS-THROUGH
ENTITIES: MEMORANDUM NO. 2, 72–73 (1996); Burke, supra note 11, at 727–28.
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the current law’s array of anti-abuse rules.203 At the same time, it
ignores all of the abusive distributions that a recognition-based
approach would eliminate. Even so, I do not mean to suggest that
concern about disguised distributions is without merit; the ease with
which a partnership might achieve comparable results through an
alternative transaction is an important consideration in rethinking
subchapter K’s distribution system. But it is neither a new concern,
nor a concern unique to partnership taxation. Disguised transactions
are a universal problem in the federal income tax and, hence,
solutions relying on general tax principles might prove promising in
addressing abusive distributions.204 It is indeed hard to imagine that
the application of general tax principles would produce worse results
than subchapter K’s current system of taxing partnership
distributions.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article offers an alternative vision of partnership
distributions, drawing its inspiration from an unexpected source—the
inimitable section 751(b) disproportionate distribution rule.
Partnership distributions are deeply flawed, and the time has come to
rethink everything about these ubiquitous transactions, beginning
with the nonrecognition premise at the system’s foundation. This
Article thus reimagines partnership distributions liberated from
nonrecognition, proposing a system grounded in commercial reality,
where liquidating distributions would be treated as taxable exchanges
between the partnership and the distributee partner.

203. As one partnership tax scholar presciently noted: “It may seem somewhat opportunistic
to defend the permissiveness of the distribution rules on the ground that stricter rules would be
self-defeating due to their easy avoidability. Indeed, dissatisfaction with the flexibility of
partnership allocations generally, as well as with the perceived shortcomings of the disguised sale
rules, may fuel more radical proposals to curb the permissiveness of the distribution rules.”
Burke, supra note 11, at 728.
204. Indeed, sharing responsibility for abusive distributions with provisions outside
subchapter K would serve an expressive function, reflecting the reality of modern partnerships.
The activities of partnerships that pursue tax shelters are unpredictable, and their transactions are
increasingly individualized. Even worse, the current law has proven problematic for the large
number of partnerships that are not engaged in tax shelters themselves, but are nonetheless forced
to bear the complexity of subchapter K’s formidable distribution system. In the increasingly
polarized world of partnership taxation, it may simply no longer be possible (if it ever was) to
design functional provisions that prevent the abusive distributions of sheltering partnerships and
simultaneously promote the legitimate commercial interests of non-sheltering partnerships.

TAXING REALITY

2014]

10/7/2014 6:48 PM

TAXING REALITY

729

With recognition guiding our thinking about partnership
distributions, transformative changes would become possible.
Aligning the tax treatment of distributions with their economic
substance would streamline the system, reducing the number and
complexity of subchapter K’s distribution provisions. At the same
time, a recognition rule would prevent abuse by cutting off deferral
at the time of distribution. Reduced complexity and abuse, in turn,
would lead to greater stability in partnership distributions, with
partnerships able to see the system applying equally to all
partnerships, regardless of their income or sophistication levels.
Taken together, a recognition-based approach would thus improve
the functionality of partnership distributions, taking important steps
toward simplicity, equity, and stability in subchapter K.
Reforming partnership distributions offers a unique lens through
which to consider the larger project of rethinking partnership
taxation. Distributions are distinctively situated in subchapter K,
standing at the intersection of its many provisions, abuses, and
dysfunctions. Distributions are thus the perfect incubator for thinking
deeply about partnership taxation and its future. Indeed, solving the
problem of partnership distributions may clear a path to more
comprehensive reforms in this important, but under-theorized, area
of the federal income tax.
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